

POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: STATE, OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS

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Abstract. In the 21st century, terrorism has become a global problem and one of the main factor in world politics at all levels. Cyclical economic and financial crises have a detrimental effect on the state of the social sphere in all countries without exception, thereby creating fertile ground for radical sentiments and terrorist intentions. The growth of geopolitical tension in the world over the past decades has also contributed to the expansion of the activity of terrorist groups around the globe.

This article through SWOT analysis attempts to study the state of the EU's fight against terrorism. The threat of terrorism and its most severe manifestations also affected the countries of the European Union, which prompted it to develop a specific policy in the fight against terrorism and improve methods for preventing and neutralizing the terrorist threat. When analyzing the development process of anti-terrorist structures and the practice of combating terrorism in the European Union in 2001-2020, one can distinguish undoubted achievements of the anti-terrorist course. The weaknesses and objective shortcomings of this course stem from the complexities in world politics and macroeconomics, as well as from the very nature of the EU as a supranational structure.

Keywords: terrorism, fighting terrorism, security, European Union, counter-terrorism strategy, counter-terrorism methods.

JEL codes: F50, F51.

Аңдатпа. ХХІ ғасырда терроризм жаһандық мәселеге және барлық деңгейдегі әлемдік саясаттың негізгі факторларының біріне айналды. Оралмалы экономикалық және қаржылық дағдарыстар барлық елдердегі әлеуметтік саланың жай-күйіне жағымсыз әсер етіп, ұшқары көңіл-күй мен террористік ниеттерге қолайлы жағдай жасайды. Соңғы онжылдықтардағы әлемдегі геосаяси шиеленістің өсуі де жер шарындағы лаңкестік топтардың белсенділігінің кеңеюіне ықпал етті.

Бұл мақалада SWOT талдауды қолдана отырып, ЕО-ның терроризмге қарсы күресінің жай-күйін зерттеу әрекеті жасалды. Терроризм қаупі және оның ең ауыр көріністері Еуропалық Одақ елдеріне де әсер етті, бұл оны терроризмге қарсы күресте нақты саясатты әзірлеуге және терроризм қаупінің алдын алу және залалсыздандыру әдістерін жетілдіруге итермеледі. 2001-2020 жж. Еуропалық Одақтағы терроризмге қарсы құрылымдардың даму үдерісін және терроризммен күрес тәжірибесін талдауда терроризмге қарсы курстың сөзсіз жетістіктеріне көз жеткізуге болады. Сонымен бірге, бұл курстың әлсіз жақтары мен объективті кемшіліктері әлемдік саясат пен макроэкономикадағы күрделіліктен, сондай-ақ ЕО-ның ұлттан жоғары құрылым ретіндегі табиғатынан туындайды.

Түйін сөздер: терроризм, терроризммен күрес, қауіпсіздік, Еуропалық одақ, терроризмге қарсы стратегия, терроризммен күресу әдістері.

JEL кодтары: F50, F51.

Аннотация. В ХХІ веке терроризм стал глобальной проблемой и одним из основных факторов мировой политики на всех уровнях. Циклические экономические, финансовые кризисы губительно влияют на состояние социальной сферы во всех странах без исключения, порождая тем самым благодатную почву для радикальных

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настроений, террористических намерений. Рост геополитического напряжения в мире за последние десятилетия также способствует росту и расширению активности террористических групп по всему земному шару.

В данной статье с применением SWOT- анализа предпринята попытка исследования состояния борьбы ЕС с терроризмом. Угроза терроризма и его самые жесткие проявления коснулись и стран Европейского Союза, что подвигло его выработать определенную политику в борьбе с терроризмом и усовершенствовать методы упреждения и нейтрализации террористической опасности. При анализе эволюции антитеррористической политики и практики борьбы с терроризмом в Европейском Союзе за 2001–2020 годы можно убедиться в несомненных достижениях общеевропейского антитеррористического курса. Слабые стороны и объективные недостатки этого курса вытекают из сложностей в мировой политике и макроэкономике, так и из самой природы ЕС как наднациональной структуры.

Ключевые слова: терроризм, борьба с терроризмом, безопасность, Европейский Союз, контртеррористическая стратегия, методы борьбы с терроризмом.

JEL коды: F50, F51.

Introduction

A series of terrible terrorist attacks in Europe have occurred in recent years. The lawlessness of terrorists committed in these countries, in the most popular places, has raised many questions about the role of authorities and law enforcement agencies in an emergency. Criminals who have close ties with the Islamic State (banned in Kazakhstan), unhindered operated in these countries. Exploding bombs, they immediately hid in neighboring countries. Terrorist attacks in Europe, directly related to radical Islamism, provoked a discussion about the reasons for the ubiquity of this particular type of terror. The problem was exacerbated by the migration crisis in Europe in 2015-16 due to political instability in the Middle East. Numerous crowds of refugees on the southern, eastern borders of the EU and their reception have put on the agenda the problem of ensuring security at a daily level, including the prevention of terrorist acts. It was natural that the migration crisis, coupled with the terrorist threat, became a subject of political debate both at the national level and at the level of the central institutions of the EU. This issue still causes a lot of discussion within the framework of the theoretical problem of understanding the essence and evolution of terrorism in Europe in the context of recent events.

This article aims is to analyze the formation and evolution of the EU anti-terrorist policy, as well as to determine the development prospects and risks in further activity. The goal was achieved through the following tasks:

- to determine the conceptual, functional foundations for the formation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy;
- to identify factors opposing benefits, namely shortcomings, at the current stage of development;

- to analyze potential and upcoming opportunities to improve the current situation;

- to reveal factors that could jeopardize potential development prospects of the EU counter-terrorism strategy.

Methods of the research

With the aim to analyze the chosen topic properly, it was decided to use the methods of SWOT analysis, besides the collecting of needed data. In order to identify proper information on the counter terroristic measures taken by EU starting from 2001 the official website of the European Union was used as primary data base. Secondary data were used to find out the synthesis of the above primary data for the distribution of information for the SWOT analysis on the topic.

Terrorism is no longer primarily an external threat to the European Union. When it comes to this topic, experts come across various stages in the development of the EU's anti-terrorism strategy. It was based on a few triggering events that affected not only the Union's member states but also other countries at a global level of danger. As a result, the events of September 11, 2001, as well as the rise in terrorist activity in EU countries in 2015-2016, should be regarded as the primary catalyst for the implementation of EU anti-terrorism legislation (*Luppov, 2009, p. 305*). An analysis of the evolution of the counter-terrorism policy and practical measures within its framework in the European Union from 2001 to 2013 shows the undoubted achievements of such a course, as well as its objective shortcomings. This fact has certainly drawn the attention of the international scientific community, as these activities resulted in significant human and material losses. This means that this

organization's anti-terrorism approach is not rock-solid and impenetrable. Depending on the global agenda, any political course requires timely changes and additions.

Most aspects of the fight against terrorism considered in this paper have undoubtedly reached a high point of development; however, the growth of geopolitical tension in the world sets the task of updating the anti-terrorist course the EU. (*Yuranets, 2020*). The updated anti-terrorist policy of the EU is of both scientific and practical interest in today's realities.

Main strengths of the current EU counter-terrorism measures and policies

The problem of combating terrorism in the 1970s prompted the member states of the European Economic Community to cooperate in this area. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the explosions in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), it acquired a systemic, doctrinal character. Then the EU acted reactively, calling for the solidarity of all member states in the fight against terrorism. The necessary measures for a solidarity policy against the threat of terrorism, which had been discussed for several years, but constantly postponed due to high costs, technical difficulties, as well as disagreements between member states and EU institutions, were immediately adopted. At present, the terrorism has ceased to be a predominantly external threat for the EU. At the beginning of the XXI century the frequency and geography of terrorist attacks have increased significantly. That's why the fight against terrorism began to occupy a special place in EU policy. The member states of the regional integration association have faced an onslaught of lethal pressure from radicals lately. Forced measures bring extremely contradictory results, which is required to be proved by this study. However, according to some observations, there is also a kind of hope in this path of the EU's development, in the form of potential cooperation, new ideas of authorized persons, planned impact measures, etc.

The following methods are characteristic of modern diplomacy: direct diplomatic negotiations; involving the wider democratic community in the fight against the policy of aggression, terrorism, nationalism, racism, radicalism; Shuttle diplomacy,

mediation; publicity of international action maneuvering, using contradictions among opponents; summit meetings, direct negotiations of leaders of states; ultimatums; compromises; propaganda in the interests of achieving foreign policy goals active involvement of non-governmental organizations in solving diplomacy problems. Thus, we can identify the first de-facto and de-jure aspect of the official strategy on combatting terrorism: Use of diplomatic methods, which means less violent approach to problem solving. Diplomatic methods are known as non-violent, peaceful, streamlined, tactful, evasive, careful strategical actions directed on preventing or solving maturing conflicts. The EU's official Counter-Terrorism Agenda of 2020 includes:

- **Anticipate:** identifying vulnerabilities, building capacity where most needed;
- **Prevent:** tackling radicalization at all levels;
- **Protect:** increasing security, denying terrorist the means to act, reinforcing external borders;
- **Respond:** minimizing impact, allowing prosecution, increasing support to victims (*D'Amato and Terlizzi, 2022*).

Quick adjustment to world standards and reactionary changes in politics with each incident has been noticed apparently since the series of terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001, when immediately right after, on June 3, 2002, an anti-terrorist action plan was adopted. It states measures in a range of spheres to effectively conduct a contribution such as police and judicial cooperation; establishing of bilateral relations with the countries of Middle East, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Afghanistan along with third countries; Air Transport Defense; Immediate Preparedness; Using measures of economic and financial nature. Another one example can be provided looking back for terrorism assaults in Brussels and Paris in 2015. Soon after 2015 European Agenda on Security was promoted.

The EU has developed a common definition for terrorist activities, brought repressive measures to a common denominator in all its states and created a pan-European arrest warrant. This instrument aims to promote international cooperation, especially between EU member states, in the absence of a universally agreed

definition. However, specialists can approach to this statement in 2 ways, one of which is assumed as positive. In fact, more repressive punishments for acts of terrorism and a pan-European arrest warrant have been shared by Member States, but still a separate approach to the problem prevails over a generally accepted one. From the point of view of international trends in encouraging or punishing terrorist acts, the general repressive measures throughout the entire EU made the right decision, thereby relying on the commonality of the laws of the countries of a single regional integration association.

To ensure cooperation between the EU member states within the framework of this strategy, a post of coordinator has been established in Brussels, whose task is to coordinate the actions of the competent authorities of the participating countries to prevent terrorist acts, as well as to ensure the safety of citizens and important objects. The role of the communicative activity of the coordinator increased gradually, his main functions expanded over time, despite a number of obstacles in this direction. Today, the functions of the EU counterterrorism coordinator have become clearer and presented in the following form:

- coordinating the activity of the European Council in the fight against terrorism;
- providing adequate recommendations and proposals on priority areas of activity for the Council of the EU;
- monitoring the implementation of the EU Anti-Terrorist Strategy;
- monitoring the effectiveness of instruments of struggle to prevent terrorism;
- encouragement and support of cooperation between the EU member states with other countries in the anti-terrorist field.

Availability of biometric passports appeared to combat document forgery and enhance the security of international transport. The difference between a biometric passport and a simple one is that the first is equipped with a microchip with passport and biometric data of the passport holder. It has 10 more pages than a regular one. The validity period of a biometric passport is 10 years, an old passport is 5 years (*Devino, 2004*). Increased powers of Europol, the EU's international criminal police, to strengthen the fight against cyber

terrorism, recruitment and terrorist financing networks. This has contributed to the fact that today Europol successfully coordinates cooperation between the police services of all EU member states, actively disseminating up-to-date information among national security structures. Information received through such a reliable channel is recognized as a valuable source of analytical data for effective work at both the national and central levels (*Ermakova, 2018, p. 70*).

The EU constantly advocates the development of this term, as well as for the solidarity of all EU member states if one of them falls victim to terror. The constant desire to modernize the term at its core often means documentary literacy, which is an important aspect of the synthesis of all EU member states. The development of the definition in this case sometimes confirms the desire to work together in the fight against terrorism on a legal basis.

At that time measures were taken to increase the level of readiness of the authorities and ordinary citizens to prevent and repel a possible terrorist attack. In the aftermath of the US anthrax panic fears have intensified that weapons of mass destruction (WMD): chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear can become available to terrorist groups. The response to such a threat was a communiqué on the need to be prepared to repel an attack using biological and chemical weapons adopted in June 2003 by the European Commission. Then recommendations on algorithm of actions for the authorities, as well as for ordinary citizens in the case of a bioterrorist attack have been prepared. The European Council has developed a new "Weapons of mass destruction program" which provides a series of sequential steps to be taken to prevent a terrorist attack or, failing this, to minimize its destructive consequences. In addition to this, a European Life Support Infrastructure Protection Program and a Crisis Alert System are being established (*Potemkina, 2015, p. 52*).

The Plan of Action called "European policy to combat terrorism" of 2001 states that it means binding the EU into a single long-term anti-terrorist strategy, meaning that the changing heads of structures will no longer be able to predetermine the respective agenda based on their own national priorities. It was important to

consider the problem both from the point of view of collective security and through the prism of national interests.

International terrorism being a product of globalization acquires a transnational, network character while terrorism at the national level is characterized by greater fragmentation and uneven manifestation.

Some shifts in the strengthening of the fight against terrorism were also noticeable at the national level. For instance, after September 11, 2001 in France the customs and gendarmerie enhanced the quality of technical control of information on the problem of terrorism. Great Britain distinguished itself by the fact that in 2003 it adopted a special national anti-terrorist strategy CONTEST. Within this strategy, conflict prevention is given a decisive role, mainly through contacts with "risk groups", which include potential supporters of terrorism. Since 2001, the Spanish government has taken a course of more active participation in the initiatives of the common European security. National analytical structures such as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Center established by the German authorities became operational on December 14, 2004 (*Bazarkina, 2015, p. 242*).

Analysis of weaknesses of EU counter-terrorism measures and policies

Since each event or phenomenon has its both objective strong and weak points, various works and facts were presented on the Media from the latter side as well. This is a set of qualities and tendencies that are determined by physical, psychological, political, legal, reactive, etc. characteristics, depending on the object of research. Lack of more assertive methods of counter terrorism strategy is quite disputable deed that controversies to diplomatic and humanitarian methods. Some list of states, which combatting of terrorism reached to a so-called success show more tough and rough response to such type of crime and criminal offense. This list comprises the countries of CIS. The advantage of such approach is in its ground personnel strategy, and less in communicative aspect (*Voynikov, 2019*).

Insufficiency of finances does not allow the effective formation and maintenance of the functioning of counter-terrorism structures and mechanisms at the interstate

level. The EU member states, although they voted for the creation of new structures to combat terrorism, have not succeeded in allocating sufficient financial resources to them. Some EU member states see the newly created European counter-terrorism agencies as duplicating the work of other regional and international organizations. To some extent, this is a fair view since many of Europol's functions overlap with those of Interpol.

As for the national intelligence services, they are conceived to evade European-wide demands for the exchange of classified information. The creation of the European FBI and CIA is still far away, the EU countries concentrate on bilateral cooperation. According to experts, in order to achieve the goal stated in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, it is important to carry out purposeful work to solve the problem noted above. But a number of differences in national identities, historical experiences and national interests and priorities of individual countries are a significant barrier to EU member states' ability to successfully share intelligence data and coordinate joint investigations (*The European Union, 2020*).

A significant number of organizations within the EU constantly create managerial confusion, duplication of functions and, as a result, competition between similar structures. In addition to insufficient funding, Pan-European Cooperation in the field of combating terrorism is also experiencing a shortage of highly qualified personnel, difficulties in the exchange of intelligence information between EU member states, since each of them fears that, along with secret data, they will have to share part of their national sovereignty.

Social factors contribute to the persistence of the terrorist threat in European countries, despite the rapid and generally successful institutionalization of the fight against terrorism. In the EU countries, acute social problems have not been eradicated, such as unemployment, the rapid growth of which is denied even in the EU Anti-Terrorism Strategy, and the ghettoization of migrants who have been attracted to European countries for many years as cheap labor force. The policy of the EU countries to integrate foreign workers into their communities, especially in the early stages of their recruitment, has proved to be

ineffective. Along with the continuing property and social stratification, in recent decades, the dissatisfaction of migrants and their children, who are already full citizens of European countries, but often do not receive the same guarantees, the realization of the right to skilled work and the same respect in society that native Europeans receive, has grown.

Migrant dissatisfaction is not the only problem in the EU social continuum. Over the past two decades rising unemployment, corruption, falling educational levels and the rise of a quasi-religious terrorist threat have provoked some native Europeans to create new or join existing ultra-right organizations. The intensification of terrorist attacks by neo-Nazis since 2008, that is, at the beginning of the global economic crisis, is an indirect confirmation of the dependence of European ultra-right activism on the economic and social situation. The same is true of far-left organizations that actively use public protest to justify acts of terrorism.

In such a situation, the policy of multiculturalism turned out to be ineffective in general, and, in particular, in the communicative aspect. The study of the cultures of the peoples of the EU by all groups of its population, which is a topical aspect of creating a truly European community, is not on the agenda. There is a need for education aimed at preserving and developing own culture as part of European and world culture and such training implies acquaintance of citizens with the best examples of literature, art, scientific achievements of different cultures of the world.

Also, many experts note the inability of think tanks to anticipate the possible actions of terrorists. This weakness can be considered as common level of development of each existing think tank in the globe. As it was mentioned, nowadays terrorism has become transnational and networked, so there is still a huge possibility to identify and neutralize potential criminals in case of coordinated work of special services and think tanks.

There is a factor of confusion among police officers patrolling the streets of European capitals and intelligence agencies, developing strategies and tactics to combat the common evil that were at the forefront. Many studies note their constant antagonism

instead of close cooperation. The new technical capabilities used by the European counter-terrorism structures could not bring the fight against international terrorism to a new level due to lack of personnel, insufficient funding, the decline in the prestige of the police profession and, of course, the difficult international situation.

Prospects and new opportunities for the development of the problem

Opportunities of the problem solution

One of the effective options for countering terrorism is European regional cross-border cooperation, which allows to achieve the goals with the least bureaucratic delays. The effectiveness of this type of interaction is determined by various factors: from a common border to an equally difficult situation with immigration, in particular the Middle East. So, on March 19, 2013, a new Franco-Belgian agreement, Tournai II, was signed on police and customs cooperation. However, this agreement came into force only on October 1, 2015, almost two and a half years later, just on the eve of the November tragedy in Paris. Ironically, the agreement, designed to work together quickly and effectively to counter terrorists on the spot, again faced a complex and lengthy bureaucratic procedure for ratification in accordance with common European decision-making practice.

Terrorist financing is still being as one of the complex, unresolved issues in the fight against terrorism in the EU and around the world. The two most important goals: "Developing common principles for EU members to receive and share information that can lead to a reduction in the sources of financing of terrorism; Increase financial transparency and accountability of non-profit organizations by introducing an appropriate code of behavior" - are identified by the EU as priorities in the fight against terrorism in 2005. It is important to monitor the information needed to transfer funds. All European banks are required to provide personal information about customers who transfer or receive money outside the EU. Also, there are such offers according to that directive:

- Confiscation of proceeds from crime;
- Receiving orders to freeze assets;
- Control over the transfer of cash

outside the external borders of the EU;

- Introduce a code of conduct to discourage terrorist use of charities"; (*Committee of experts on terrorism, 2008*).

The creation of a financial intelligence network to prevent terrorism and exchange information with countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, measures to improve data sharing and law enforcement cooperation and withdrawal of content which propagandizes terrorism from being posted on social media were proposed by EU in 2020. Today the security services of the EU countries are actively cooperating on a bilateral and multilateral basis within the framework of specific programs and projects. This level of cooperation between the EU anti-terrorist agencies is an indicator of the formation of a pan-European path for the development of security policy and its institutionalization.

The fight against terrorism and its prevention in the EU are facing a dilemma caused by the development of integration processes. The formation of the closest union with the elimination of borders for the free movement of people, goods and services, which is the existential goal of European integration, now creates extremely favorable conditions for global terrorism. It is known that the successful fight against international terrorism requires strengthening cross-border cooperation within the EU and monitoring of border crossings and financial transactions, which negatively affects the value system of the EU itself.

According to experts, along with the institutions and development of counter-terrorism mechanisms at the supranational level, bilateral cooperation between individual states and national bodies will remain the most convenient and optimal participants in anti-terrorist activities. The close cooperation between the intelligence services of France and Spain, as well as their courts and law enforcement agencies in the fight against the terrorist Basque organization is a vivid example of such a statement. At the same time, the analysis of regional trends, assessment of threats and assistance to EU Member States in the development of legislation and training of law enforcement agencies, professional judges can be perceived as a relevant EU policy on

combating terrorism. In addition, EU officials can organize intergovernmental conferences and seminars to exchange information and experience on countering terrorism. Such activities will give a chance to avoid duplication of action in the fight against terrorism and strengthen European cooperation in the fight against terrorism inside and outside the EU (*The European Parliament and of the Council, 2017*).

Current situation and future opportunities of the risks

If earlier terrorist acts took place in individual EU countries, now the entire territory of the Union is under threat. Moreover, the frequency of terrorist attacks has increased, as well as the mechanisms and tools of committing terrorist crimes have expanded. Changing circulation of personnel attraction. There is a possibility of not calling in. This fact directly relates to the migration policy of each of the member countries. The 2004 expansion was the impetus for a complete modernization of the procedure for receiving migrants and refugees from the Middle East, North Africa, etc. Lack of time to implement the plans and goals can be viewed as an organizational slack. Terrorism, by its very nature, is a rather spontaneous, spontaneous, and unpredictable phenomenon, the reaction to which is difficult to accelerate over a decade of working with legal and field methods. Even the most well-coordinated plan of action is threatened by the limited amount of time allocated early. This issue can be viewed from two sides: a delayed instant reaction to a sharply overdue incident and an accelerated development of actions and ideas of a terrorist nature, the changes of which are almost impossible to predict even for the best analytical institutions in of the EU.

There are still problems in the EU that may cause a discrediting of the effectiveness of cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism activities. The underdeveloped cooperation between EU Member States and specialized European agencies such as Europol and Eurojust negatively affects the overall state of counter-terrorism activities. The lack of a system in the exchange of information between intelligence agencies and official bodies delays sufficient coordination of joint investigations and operations. Financial constraints are the main reason for the impossibility of the

formation and effective functioning of counter-terrorism structures based on interstate cooperation.

Efforts to create a pan-European intelligence community have not succeeded due to the strong influence of external actors. The pro-American policy of some EU members, which raises numerous questions from other EU countries, can be considered as the main reason for the lack of unanimity on the issue of creating own intelligence community structure. The failure of attempts to formulate a Common Foreign and Security Policy during the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as during the attack on Iraq in 2003 were evidences of this. It should also be taken into account that a number of participating countries are experiencing problems with the budget, technological underdevelopment and insufficiently trained personnel. Therefore, some states may be selective in cooperation giving preference to countries known for the high level of their power structures and intelligence services.

In European states there is still a fear that if secret materials are transferred to the special services of another state, control over them will be practically lost. This is critical when the source of information is revealed, which can lead to its compromise. Naturally, in the event of information leakage, the consequences can be unpredictable. Representatives of individual states proceed from the fact that the government of a foreign state, having received secret information, will draw its own conclusions about the state of a competing intelligence service, which, of course, is perceived as a threat to national security. Thus, until the exchange of information between special services and law enforcement agencies is established, as well as coordination and participation in joint investigations and operations, high risks for further cooperation will be tangible.

Counter-terrorism operations are faced with the continuous improvement of technical skills by terrorist groups, adapting to updated security measures. The use by terrorists of hawala mechanisms, a trust-based money transfer system that has long existed in the countries of the East, also makes it difficult to put a barrier in the way of terrorism. After the European authorities were able to cross the financing of terrorist acts through the monitoring of banking systems, the terrorists revived the old hawala mechanism.

Moreover, during the first two decades of the new century, terrorism has evolved significantly. Unlike their predecessors terrorists of the 21st century hide their affiliation with a particular group and do not openly express their ideological preferences. It is known that Anders Breivik was preparing for the 2011 attacks for nine years and skillfully hid it (*Macklin and Bjørge, 2011, p.14*). Improvement of technical means the creation of radio-controlled equipment, new explosives, and poisons, facilitating the possibility of acquiring a variety of goods, including those necessary for the commission of a terrorist attack, also became some help in terrorist activities.

Conclusion

Answering to the earlier mentioned four questions, this analytical research reached to such kind of results: the strength aspects can be discussed more in terms of security and improvement of further Action Plans of prevention terrorism. It supposed to be mentioned that measures taken are more diplomatic, which is considered to correspond to maintaining of Human Rights. The question of outweighing of weak sides in relation to strong ones is still open. Many aspects should be developed or changed fundamentally. The range of issues to deal with is assertive as well, which of that reflects in the lack of special personnel in various spheres on combating terrorism.

Some local governments in European countries do not have a stable or consistent policy regarding the employment of migrants. Therefore, the internal or domestic factor of countering terrorism is another important subject for search and solution. Further evolution in the EU anti-terroristic strategy can solve the existing problems in anti-terrorist activity. Despite the high level of terrorist threat the special services of France and Belgium have experienced a significant reduction in the number of personnel due to the large-scale introduction of video surveillance systems and the replacement of real patrols by local activists.

While experiencing tragic moments as a result of the terrorist attacks, the Europeans demonstrated moral resilience, the leadership both at the national and European levels showed a readiness to resist terrorism, but at the same time there was some confusion among those who were

on the front lines of the struggle.

The role of technological progress and the emergence of sophisticated computer programs for collecting information about criminals and tracking them is well known. But in the EU, as elsewhere, new technical capabilities could not bring the fight against international terrorism to a new level for banal reasons. Experts have to state that all the high technologies and databases used in the fight against terrorism turned out to be incapable of preventing the latest terrorist attacks in Europe. As time has shown, nothing can replace human presence. The question of training, employment, and

remuneration of those who really risk their lives in the police and intelligence services, got lost in the exorbitantly inflated and unjustified spending on innovative programs.

In conditions when armed terrorists move freely from one country to another, from one city to another, new issues related to the very essence, the evolution of European integration over the past decades appear on the agenda. Ensuring pan-European security and neutralizing a possible terrorist threat require national and supranational authorities to pay closer attention to the social problems of communities.

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ПОЛИТИКА ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА В БОРЬБЕ С ТЕРРОРИЗМОМ: СОСТОЯНИЕ, ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ И ОГРАНИЧЕН ИЯ

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