

KAZAKHSTANI FOREIGN POLICY ELITE: CONCEPTUAL APPROACH AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY

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Abstract. The article analyzes the influence of the Kazakhstani foreign policy elite in the context of the geopolitical challenges of the present time. The article reflects a specific case of a geopolitical challenge as a military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the position and consequences for Kazakhstan. Relying on the idea of neo-Eurasianism since the formation of our country and, accordingly, the priority tasks of the concept of foreign policy, Kazakhstan invariably continues to move along the path of a multi-vector policy. Experts and analysts actively criticized and supported the multi-vector policy in making foreign policy decisions. It is worth noting that the principles formed over 30 years in the country's foreign policy give fruitful results and solutions, but there are difficulties in the foreign economic sphere, while having a huge arsenal for stable implementation, but since our country is an integral part of the system of international relations, any challenge in the international arena affects both our country and all countries of the world. The conclusions and recommendations in this article fully reveal the advantages of Kazakhstan over geopolitical threats and challenges, in no way inferior to the great powers.

Keywords: Foreign policy elite, Republic of Kazakhstan, diplomacy, multi-vector approach, integration, economic development.

JEL codes: F5, O1, R1

Аңдатпа. Мақалада қазіргі заманның геосаяси сын-тегеуріндері жағдайында қазақстандық сыртқы саяси элитаның ықпалына талдау жүргізіледі. Мақалада Украина мен Ресейдің әскери қақтығысы ретінде геосаяси шақырудың нақты жағдайы, Қазақстан үшін ұстанымы мен салдары көрсетілген. Біздің еліміз қалыптасқан сәттен бастап нео-Еуроазияшылдық идеясына және тиісінше сыртқы саяси бағыт тұжырымдамасының басым міндеттеріне сүйене отырып, Қазақстан көпвекторлы саясат жолымен ілгерілеуді жалғастыруда. Сарапшылар мен талдаушылар сыртқы саяси шешімдер қабылдауда көпвекторлықты белсенді түрде сынға алды және қолдады. Еліміздің сыртқы саясатында 30 жыл бойы қалыптасқан қағидаттар жемісті нәтижелер мен шешімдер жолдарын беретінін, бірақ тұрақты іске асыру үшін үлкен арсеналға ие бола отырып, сыртқы экономикалық салада қиындықтар бар екенін, бірақ біздің еліміз халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінің ажырамас бөлігі болып табылатындықтан, халықаралық аренадағы кез келген сын-тегеурін біздің елге де әсер етеді, әлемнің барлық елдері де солай. Осы мақаладағы қорытындылар мен ұсынымдар Қазақстанның геосаяси қатерлер мен сын-тегеуріндер алдындағы артықшылығын толық ашып көрсетеді, ұлы державалардан еш кем түспейді.

Түйін сөздер: сыртқы саяси элита, Қазақстан Республикасы, дипломатия, көпвекторлы, интеграция, экономикалық даму.

JEL кодтар: F5, O1, R1

Аннотация. В статье проводится анализ влияния казахстанской внешнеполитической элиты в условиях геополитических вызовов нынешнего времени. В статье отражается конкретный кейс геополитического вызова как военный конфликт Украины и России, позиция и последствия для Казахстана. Опираясь на идею неоевразийства с момента формирования нашей страны и соответственно приоритетных задач концепции внешнеполитического курса, Казахстан неизменно продолжает двигаться по пути многовекторной политики. Эксперты и аналитики активно критиковали и поддерживали многовекторность в принятии внешнеполитических решениях. Стоит отметить, что принципы сформированные на протяжении 30 лет во внешней политики страны дают плодотворные результаты и пути решений, но имеются сложности во внешнеэкономической сфере, имея при этом огромный арсенал для стабильной реализации, но так как наша страна является неотъемлемой частью системы международных отношений, любой вызов на международной арене влияет как на нашу страну, так и на все страны мира. Выводы и рекомендации в данной статье полностью раскрывают преимущества Казахстана перед геополитическими угрозами и вызовами, несколько не уступая великим державам.

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Ключевые слова: Внешнеполитическая элита, Республика Казахстан, дипломатия, многовекторность, интеграция, экономическое развитие.

JEL коды: F5, O1, R1

Introduction

The relevance of the research topic is about current geopolitical shifts in Eurasian continent. In this sense, the most suitable research object is the position of Kazakhstan in terms of transformed world and influence of the foreign policy elite on these challenges. Before starting with the theoretical part of this article, we would like to mention the definition of Kazakhstani foreign policy elite. The Kazakhstani foreign policy elite is a category of the elite that is directly responsible for the implementation of the tasks set in accordance with the concept of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This category includes: the Head of State, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic corps, representatives of the defense structure, the business elite, political experts.

Let's consider the theoretical framework of research article. The concept of Eurasianism today is one of the philosophical traditions, the futuristic orientation of which contributes to its active revival. Thus modern Eurasianism, while maintaining its connection to its classical incarnation in the early 20th century, has certainly changed significantly. We can say that Eurasianism today is represented by three main areas: academic, applied and political. In the social and humanitarian space, a term such as «neo-Eurasianism» is increasingly heard, updating the Eurasian tradition, but taking into account a fundamentally different historical situation, completely different development trends inspired by modernity. Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has been actively working to implement integration processes, both in the direction of the Eurasian vector and in the direction of the Central Asian Union, taking into account the interests and priorities of the Turkic world. Until now, the initiatives of Kazakhstan in these areas have not been properly understood, as well as the wishes of other participants in the integration processes. Today, however, we are seeing a completely different trend.

There is also criticism from the European expert world. One such expert is Luca Ancheschi, Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, in his work «Kazakh Foreign Policy Analysis: The Neo-Eurasian Regime in the Age of Nazarbayev», examines

the ideas and constructs associated with Eurasia and the impact they had on shaping Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the era of Nazarbayev. He emphasized that in the book he would like to refute two myths about Kazakhstan's foreign policy: the myth of multi-vectorism and the myth of Central Asian regionalism. The first consists of various official and generally accepted statements that categorically declare the multi-vector nature of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. He believed that Kazakhstan's multi-vector approach has been dead for the past 20 years, if by this we mean not only official statements, but also actual foreign policy actions. As he explained further on, multivectorization is the ability to carry out this type of action with the same emphasis, with a policy of attracting interests from different regions. In fact, Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the last 20 years has been concentrated on a certain set of countries, which are part of the so-called post-Soviet Eurasia. All other directions of Kazakhstan's foreign policy are less pronounced: the Western direction, especially relations with the EU, weakened after the country's chairmanship in the OSCE and the subsequent hardening of the internal field. The vector of Central Asian regionalism, which was often pathetically declared by the Kazakh authorities as a priority, is in fact, according to Ancheschi, another myth. A separate chapter of his book is devoted to the history of Central Asian regionalism. He concluded that Kazakhstan became the biggest disrupter of the Central Asian space once that space became too small for President Nazarbayev. Ancheschi compares Kazakhstan's exit and separate positioning to Kazakhstan's place in Soviet times, when the region was called "Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia" (*Ancheschi, 2020, pp. 85-114*).

Tor Bukkvoll also provided the analysis of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan as a key point of N.Nazarbayev's personality, he also analyzed the interaction of personal and national interests as a drivers of foreign policy course and how it motivated in cooperation with Russia and USA (*Bukkvoll, 2018*).

To our mind, one can disagree with Luca Ancheschi's opinion on the dead concept of multivector. Because our country preserves to this day the principles of

international law on which, in fact, the system of international relations must be based. As we can see, in fact, the world powers are the first to destroy the principles of the international relations system, where diplomacy must play a fundamental role, and not political and economic sanctions, the withdrawal of international treaties. Therefore, it can be safely noted that Kazakhstan, by promoting Eurasianism, is not a classical theory, but, as a global process, contributes to maintaining the principles of security inviolability.

Additionally, Nargis Kassenova provided controversial opinion to Luca Ancheschi's opinion, notes in her comments that the book is indeed a great work, covering almost 30 years of Kazakhstan's independence. But she points out that Nazarbayev's rise deserves more attention, especially his formation of Eurasianism before the collapse of the USSR. As a Soviet politician, Nazarbayev played a very important role in the group formalization of relations between the center and the republics and in the development of the union treaty. Having witnessed the tension that this process caused between the so-called "European republics" of the USSR and those of Central Asia, Kazakhstan was located between these two sides and was something in between. This position, which Nazarbayev realized at the end of the Soviet period, is very important for understanding the further development of the country's foreign policy. Kassenova supports Luca Ancheschi's view that there are major differences between Russian and Kazakh Eurasianism. Kazakhstan is trying to make the most of its location on the periphery of Europe. And this gives Kazakh Eurasians a different direction and a different meaning. Europe remains the embodiment of modernity and postmodernity for Kazakhstan (Kassenova, 2020).

Materials and methods

The main purpose of the article is based on the theoretical framework of the concept of neo-eurasianism, to study the influence of the Kazakhstani foreign policy elite on the system of international relations. In this article, the main source of material is concept of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, secondary data, works and assessments of foreign experts like L. Ancheschi, T. Bukkvoll, A. Sanchez, N. Contessi, domestic experts

like N.Kassenova, A.Sarym, position of foreign policy elite: K.Zh.Tokayev, M.Tleuberdi, Kazakhstani diplomatic corps, Russian experts: D.Trenin, I.Timofeev. The following methods were applied: case study method, intent-analysis, content analysis, structural-functional method.

Results (classification)

As we have already noted, geopolitical challenges in the Eurasian space occur, unfortunately, in a stable way. The most discussed topic is the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Of course, if you remember, since 2014 the conflict has not been on such a military scale as it is now. The post-pandemic period, when the economy of all countries, including superpowers, suffered during the pandemic and seemed to stabilize again against the backdrop of easing quarantine measures. At the geopolitical level, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia broke out with a new scale. To begin with, we will consider the prerequisites for this conflict, then the position of Kazakhstan and how our country can influence the outcome of the conflict between countries.

Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, is the chairman of the scientific council and head of the Foreign Policy and Security Program, in his report he mentioned the main principles and challenges of Russia, according to the concept of Russian foreign policy, two geopolitical challenges face Russia: NATO expansion to the east and a long conflict with Ukraine (Trenin, 2016). After the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, it became clear that the west would move east, which was already contrary to international agreements. As a result, we see an unfolding conflict on a military scale between the two countries.

Next, consider the position of Kazakhstan in terms of conflicting situation between Russia and Ukraine using the case study method.

Russia-Ukraine military conflict. Kazakhstan stance

Case study. On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the independence of the separatist "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic". The relevant documents were ratified by the country's parliament. Putin also

claimed that these formations include the territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. This is much more than the region controlled by the separatists.

Early in the morning of February 24, the Russian head of state announced the start of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called his goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The armed forces of the Russian Federation began to attack the cities of Ukraine and their military infrastructure, not only in Donbass.

Suggestive questions:

1. What is the position of Kazakhstan on this conflict situation?

2. How will this conflict affect the economy of Kazakhstan?

3. What is the advantage of Kazakhstan in resolving this conflict?

According to the question 1. What is the position of Kazakhstan on this conflict situation?

Before, the head of state and representatives of MFA gave information about the official position of the country, the deputy from Mazhilis, the political scientist Aydos Sarym urged his opinion, the arrival of Russia, the LPR and the DPR is a new geopolitical reality, a new geopolitical challenge, exceptional events, a new round of sanctions confrontation in general about the negative impact on our economy. In such situations, all the active political subjects of the country have a composure that does not fall into agitation. Kazakhstan must be consistent: note a new reality and a fact, avoid political recognition of the DPR and LPR (Sarym, 2022).

Then came the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the head of state.

Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi, assured that it is not about recognizing the LPR and the DPR by Kazakhstan, we start from the foundations of international law and the basic principles of the UN Charter. It is clear that the situation is now deteriorating, tension is growing, so Kazakhstan calls on the entire international community to use diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation (Tleuberdi, 2022).

Tokayev, announcing the country's position, said that the principle of indivisibility and common security presupposes "mutual understanding based on mutual trust." "Our

position must be based on the critical need to guarantee the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state. As the host country of the OSCE summit in 2010, we insist on the principle of the indivisibility of Eurasian security. I said this during my visit to Moscow on February 10. Unfortunately, this has not happened. The Minsk agreements remained on paper, which led to military operations on the territory of Ukraine. The geopolitical situation has worsened in an unprecedented way. And now is the time to talk about the irreversibility of this trend, unfortunately. Therefore, we call on both states to find a common language at the negotiating table, to reach agreements and agreements. There is no other way. A bad peace is better than a good fight. Without peace, there will be no development. Kazakhstan, for its part, is ready to provide all kinds of assistance, including brokerage services, if, of course, they are needed," – Tokayev told the congress of the ruling Nur Otan party (Tokayev, 2022).

In our opinion, Kazakhstan's position on this conflict is quite clear. This can be tested using intent-analysis:

- The head of state, in the first place, referred to the principles of territorial integrity. And most importantly, the principles of Eurasian security, approved at the OSCE summit in 2010, demonstrating their relevance in our time.

- The speech, the rhetoric, the tonality were confident enough, it was clear that the country's position is independent, third parties did not interfere in the formation of the position.

- And also in the speech, reasonable criticism is given in the direction of violations of the principles of the Minsk agreements.

- Also, in our opinion, there was no detailed information about the economic consequences of our country in the speech, this point should be noted as a drawback.

According to the question 2. How will this conflict affect the economy of Kazakhstan?

Before analyzing the economic consequences for Kazakhstan, it is necessary to examine what sanctions were imposed against Russia. Sanctions pressure on Russia is intensifying: Europe is determined to "strangle the Russian economy and banking system, as well as punish V. Putin's

inner circle." The US is already proud to say that its shares have reached 80% of bank assets in Russia, while the EU has reached 70%. The allies have also taken steps to restrict Russia's access to key technologies such as microchips and lasers and have spoken out against cryptocurrencies. Neighboring Belarus was also attacked.

Republican US senators have submitted a bill to the US Congress imposing sanctions on all state-owned companies in the Russian Federation, said the press service of Senator M. Rubio (Fla.), who is one of the the authors of the initiative. The bill was sarcastically named: HEROIAM SLAVA, which is a reference to the slogan of the Ukrainian nationalists. The initiative will affect companies such as Rosneft, Gazprom, Rosatom, Aeroflot and RT (Tkachev, 2022).

The authors are sure that they "finance the military efforts of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin. "In addition, Washington announced that it would strengthen control over the export of equipment for refineries in Russia and limit the import of high-tech goods to Belarus. The next round of sanctions will also affect 22 Russian companies associated with the military-industrial complex. The new restrictions, the White House said in a statement, include: the ban on importing technological goods and the extension of export controls in relation to Russia to Belarus: complete blockade of Russian defense companies. A total of 22 Russian defense-related companies will be identified. This measure is the responsibility of the Department of State; control over the export of equipment for oil and gas production is being strengthened and restrictions on the export of technologies for long-term Russian oil refineries are being introduced; the Ministry of Commerce, together with other departmental partners, will expand the list of organizations that support the Russian and Belarusian armed forces.

The defense, aerospace, aeronautics, naval and high-tech industries will not be able to obtain goods and technologies for innovation and maintenance. These measures are far from consistent with the sweeping sanctions package that various Republican and Democratic lawmakers have insisted on, and D. Biden is likely to face aggression and discontent again. They did not refuse to import oil, because it will turn

against them on its own. Russia is one of the top 5 oil suppliers to the United States. However, the White House has said that the export restrictions will take effect over time, that is. it will have a long-term impact.

The European Union continues to develop the fourth sanctions package, said Austrian Foreign Minister A. Schallenberg. However, the minister did not say anything new, did not reveal any details. He only said that on Friday there would be a special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EU countries with the Secretary of State of the United States, E. Blinken (Voronova, 2022).

At the same time, he is sure that the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation have already taken effect:

- Exchanges are closed.
- The ruble is falling significantly.
- The European Union showed its muscles for the first time.

According to the Austrian Foreign Minister, the new sanctions will affect big businessmen, special lists are being prepared. The minister also said that there may be other sanctions, but did not go into detail. Regarding the sister peoples, the Belarusians, the EU has already adopted a series of new measures in addition to the sanctions of February 27, 2022: in relation to 22 high-ranking Belarusian military personnel, given their role in the decision-making and strategic planning processes that led to the participation of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. On February 24, 20 Belarusian soldiers appeared in the same context: additional restrictions on trade in goods used in the production or manufacture of tobacco products, mineral fuels, bituminous substances and gaseous hydrocarbon products, potassium chloride (potassium) products, wood products, cement products, iron and steel products and rubber products, additional restrictions on the export of dual-use goods and technologies, as well as certain advanced goods and technologies that can contribute to the military - technical development of Belarus, defense and security, together with restrictions on the provision of related services. Taking into account the latest measures, the EU sanctions against Belarus affect a total of 225 people.

According to Ivan Timofeev, RIAC Specialist, noted that the targeted sanctions are directed in one way or another against a

specific country. Restrictions on individuals affect the economy as a whole (for example, in the case of systemically important companies such as PDVSA in Venezuela). Sanctions against individuals - representatives of the "regime", "oligarchs" or other figures - are also embedded in the context of interstate relations. In other words, it is incorrect to say that targeted sanctions affect only the people on the "list" and not the states: behind the people, as a rule, there is a specific state and its interests (*Timofeev, 2020*).

EU sanctions against Russia will not affect Kazakhstan's business with Europe. Belgium stands ready to help identify and provide support measures for current and future trade cooperation between the two countries. Olivier Villox, president of the Brussels Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stated this in Brussels after a meeting with the Deputy Minister of Trade and Integration of Kazakhstan, Kairat Torebayev. At this and another meeting of the Kazakh government delegation with the leadership of the Belgian Export Promotion Agency, measures to promote and further expand bilateral trade cooperation Kairat Torebaev, Deputy Minister of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (*QazaqTV, 2022*) mentioned that last year, trade between Kazakhstan and Europe increased by 21 percent and amounted to 28.9 billion US dollars. We have selected 53 different products that we can supply to the European market worth 200 million dollars annually. This is, first of all, processing: agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, machinery. Our main task is to promote the finished products here. As for raw materials, everything is going well with us. We supply oil to the EU and we have no problem with the EU buying oil from Kazakhstan. Under the sanctions regime, Kazakhstan is not a party to the conflict, so we comply with all our regional and international obligations, and our task is that trade continues to grow at the same rate as the EU. Olivier Villox, President of the Brussels Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that the EU sanctions regime against Russia is likely to get even tougher. Whether we like it or not, this is a fact. Therefore, we must discuss and take measures to help Kazakhstan do business with Europe. Otherwise, Kazakhstan may find itself in a position of collateral loss due to the

restrictions introduced. The important thing is that we are expanding our cooperation with your country. We need to make more efforts, especially in the post-pandemic, because all this time it has been difficult to travel to your country.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, Roman Vasilenko, held a video meeting with the British Minister of State for Central and South Asia, North Africa, Lord Tariq Ahmad, and also received the British Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan, Cathy Leach. The interlocutors discussed the situation in Ukraine and the steps being taken at the international level to stop hostilities and return the parties to their resolution by peaceful means. The British side has confirmed that it does not intend to impose any sanctions on Kazakhstan in connection with Russia's military operation in Ukraine. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom "noted the high level of mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation" achieved over thirty years and "reaffirmed mutual understanding across the spectrum of issues discussed." According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parties are ready for further comprehensive development of relations (*Informburo, 2022*).

On March 1, British MP Margaret Hodge said that restrictions should be imposed not only on Russia, but also on Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which, in her opinion, "support" Vladimir Putin. According to her, the January events in Kazakhstan demonstrate "the true cost of kleptocracy", and imposing sanctions on the corrupt elite will not in itself eradicate vicious practices and will not lead to fundamental democratic transformations in Kazakhstan, but will show that we mean what we say when we commit to fighting dirty money and corruption.

The press service of the US diplomatic mission spoke about the impact of sanctions against Russia in Kazakhstan. "The situation in Ukraine is developing rapidly, so at the moment it is difficult to talk about long-term measures and their consequences. However, we want to emphasize that the US sanctions target the Russian economy and are designed to mitigate the impact on the economies of other countries, including Kazakhstan. As throughout our 30-year partnership, we are committed to helping Kazakhstan diversify and strengthen its economy," - the US diplomatic mission said in

response to a request from our country (AlmatyTV, 2022).

We adhere to the view that the economies of the EAEU countries will cooperate with China very closely, it is quite possible that in the future the Chinese yuan may become the world currency for our countries. Of course, now it is difficult to imagine how the market, logistics and, in general, the entire world foreign economic relations will develop.

There are pluses from the imposed sanctions and an opportunity for Kazakhstan. To unleash its full energy potential, independent, since the West has suspended the project to launch Nord Stream 2, this is a great opportunity for Kazakhstan and the EAEU countries to realize the energy sector.

According to the question 3. What is the advantage of Kazakhstan in resolving this conflict?

The Kazakhstani foreign policy elite adheres to diplomatic and negotiation methods in resolving conflict situations. We can recall the negotiation process on Syria at that time taking place at the dialogue platform in Astana. Peacekeeping troops of Kazakhstan in Lebanon, evacuation of recruited Kazakhstanis in Syria, humanitarian aid in India during the delta strain pandemic and much more. That is, Kazakhstan is always ready and active in resolving international problems. The advantage of foreign policy is the country's multi-vector policy.

According to the new concept of Kazakhstan's foreign policy for 2020-2030, the priorities are: security issues, the continuation of a multi-vector approach, humanitarian diplomacy, the concept of a "hearing state" (*The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2020*). A lot has already been done in the humanitarian sphere. Over the past six months, humanitarian assistance has been provided to Afghanistan with food and medicine. Over the past period, trucks with medicines have been sent to Ukraine. Assistance was also provided for the return of Kazakhstanis from Ukraine to their homeland. This is a great achievement of the entire diplomatic corps of Kazakhstan and to this day the ambassadors work in Ukraine (*Ibraim, 2022*).

With regard to specific settlement proposals, we can offer the following:

1. Direct mediation of Kazakhstan in resolving the conflict, as suggested by the head of state in his address. There is a dialogue platform in the capital, in this context, mediation of Kazakhstan should be strengthened.

2. Diasporas of Russians and Ukrainians living in Kazakhstan can contribute to the dialogue with the conflicting parties, we have such a body as the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, they will be able to expand their functionality.

3. Kazakhstani diplomats could attend the current rounds of the negotiation process in Belarus and in other countries, depending on the destination of the negotiations.

4. Once N. Nazarbayev proposed reforming the permanent members of the UN Security Council, many experts and analysts raise this issue. Kazakhstan has all the necessary criteria for a full and permanent member of the Security Council, the chances are great.

According to 4 point, Nicola Contessi, Professor, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University, mentioned that Kazakhstan played a larger role in international affairs (including being a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and the initiator of the Astana process), and this is likely to strengthen its multi-vector policy. However, the membership of the Security Council also has a role with its own institutional logic, and I would not attach too much importance to the individual votes of its members, especially the non-permanent members. However, Kazakhstan provides a forum for the Astana process and therefore must maintain a reputation as a bona fide mediator. If you look into the past, Kazakhstan has always striven to take on those international problems and roles that corresponded to the principles of the multi-vector approach. So far, actions in practice have also been consistent with the multi-vector approach, and there are no signs that the Kazakh government intends to change course (*Contessi, 2016*).

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez as an expert on geopolitics, defense, cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere and post-Soviet regions, in a recent interview, gave an assessment of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan after the January

tragic events in Almaty. The expert emphasized the peculiarity and advantage of the long-term multi-vector policy of our country, noting that before these events Kazakhstan was a friend of Brussels and Washington. And after the tragic events, the country will face sanctions from the West (Sanchez, 2022).

Drawing a conclusion with the passage of this interview, sanctions were not imposed on Kazakhstan, we appealed our actions through collective security treaties specified in the UN Charter. It follows that the West position It follows that the West could not present the position of our country in the opposite light. Further, the events in Ukraine show that it is not profitable for the West to spoil economic relations with Kazakhstan.

Discussion and conclusions

In conclusion, We would like to note that the achievements of the country depend on the right strategic approach. Drawing a conclusion regarding the critical statements and opinions of L. Ancheschi, T. Bukkvoll, A. Sanchez, regarding the general criticism of the multi-vector policy and the role of Kazakhstan in neo-Eurasianism, we believe that the multi-vector policy of our country gives positive results, direct conflicts in our country regarding other countries did not show up. Further, we have already mentioned the principles of the system of international relations that we adhere to, always referring to official agreements and charters of international organizations. What the great powers do not do and do not adhere to. And most importantly, we adhere to the principle of the indivisibility of the Eurasian space, according to the agenda of the OSCE summit in 2010.

We agree with the opinion of N. Kassenova regarding the preservation of values and heritage after the collapse of the USSR and the contribution of Kazakhstan to the process of neo-Eurasianism with the initiated projects of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, whereas N. Contessi has already mentioned about this achievement.

As for the specific case of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, we fully support the position of the Kazakhstani foreign policy elite represented by the head of state K. Zh. Tokayev, Minister of Foreign Affairs M.

Tleuberdi, deputy of the Mazhilis, political scientist A. Sarym. We also share the vision of D. Trenin and I. Timofeev on the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

We have presented a number of proposals for the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Continuing the theme of modernization of the diplomatic corps and foreign economic activity under sanction impact, we offer a number of the following recommendations to improve the work of foreign policy structures:

1. Attract young people and increase the number of graduates in the specialty "International Relations" by 50% in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Create a youth committee substructured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Great attention is paid to youth in the framework of the UN Youth 2030 strategy. It is necessary to take into account trends and give young people the opportunity to prove themselves in resolving threats and challenges on a global scale.

2. Research and strategic centers for security, economic development, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, should work together to solve problems on the international agenda.

3. It is necessary to involve and even legitimize the position of the APK and the creation of a peacekeeping team, as a clear example of harmony, unity of the whole people and in resolving interethnic conflicts not only within the country, but also outside the country.

4. Create a mediation center in Kazakhstan. With a permanent dialogue platform for resolving interstate conflicts.

5. For economic development, it is proposed to create a gas pipeline in the EU+Middle East+Kazakhstan format. To strengthen economic cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan. In particular, this proposal would contribute to a new way to stable regional interaction. For Kazakhstan, the opportunity to eradicate the need for and dependence on gas transit through neighboring countries.

These recommendations are relevant in resolving issues of security and economic development of the country.

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ҚАЗАҚСТАНДЫҚ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСИ ЭЛИТА: ТҰЖЫРЫМДАМАЛЫҚ ТӘСІЛ ЖӘНЕ ПРАКТИКАЛЫҚ ҚЫЗМЕТ

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КАЗАХСТАНСКАЯ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЭЛИТА: КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНЫЙ ПОДХОД И ПРАКТИЧЕСКАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ

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