

EMPLOYING THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE HYPOTHESIS TO EXPLAIN THE 2011 EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

Rustam MUSSA* *Master of Arts, Senior Lecturer at the branch of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Aktobe region, Aktobe, Kazakhstan, r.musa@apa.kz*

Raushan YESBERGEN *Ph.D. in Economics, Professor at branch of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Aktobe region, Aktobe, Kazakhstan, r.esbergen@apa.kz*

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Abstract. Our research question involves applying the critical juncture hypothesis formulated by Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors in the series of the articles and books to the context of the 2011 Arab Spring events. Critical juncture hypothesis states that politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a country has, because the former represents the distribution of political power. Whoever controls political institutions then can set up economic institutions, determining the rules governing economic activities and who will benefit from them. Generated resources are then used in defending these sets of institutions. Though for Acemoglu and his co-authors politics always precedes economics, it is the interplay of political and economic institutions that explain contemporary development of states. The case of 2011 Egyptian Revolution is presented, as the well-documented illustration of the hypothesis at work.

Keywords: comparative democratization, political economy, economic growth, Arab Spring.

JEL codes: I38

Аңдатпа. Берілген мақаланың зерттеу сұрағы - американдық саяси ғылымда кеңінен қолданылатын Өтпелі кезең Гипотезасын 2011 жылғы Араб көктемі оқиғаларына қолдану. Аталмыш Гипотеза бойынша, саяси және экономикалық институттардың өзара әрекеттесуі кез келген қоғамдағы басқару формасы мен халықтың әл-ауқаттылығына әсер етеді. Демократиялық үдерістер мен экономикалық өсу бір-біріне себеп-салдарлық әсер ете алмайды, керісінше олардың екеуі де бірдей тарихи оқиғалардан туады. Бұл идея Египеттегі 2011 жылғы оқиғалар мысалында суреттеледі.

Түйін сөздер: салыстырмалы демократизация, саяси экономия, экономикалық өсу, Араб көктемі.

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Аннотация. Исследовательский вопрос данной статьи заключается в попытке интерпретировать события Арабской Весны 2011 года с позиции популярной в американской политической науке, Гипотезы Переходного периода. В соответствие с данной гипотезой, взаимосвязь экономических и политических институтов в любом обществе определяет тип управления и уровень благосостояния в нем. Демократические процессы и экономический рост не могут иметь взаимной причинно-следственной связи, а напротив вызываются (или не вызываются) одними и теми же историческими событиями, то есть Переходным Периодом. Данную идею авторы статьи пытаются продемонстрировать на примере событий Арабской Весны в Египте.

Ключевые слова: сравнительная демократизация, политическая экономия, экономический рост, Арабская весна.

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Research question

The major component of the critical juncture hypothesis is that once political and economic institutions are established at certain turning historical periods of time, like the discovery of Atlantic trade at the early Modern period or the dissolution of colonial empires after World war II, their interplay creates path-dependency, meaning that the same set of institutions tends to persist over long period of time. If a small group of people

with similar occupational basis wins the conflict over determining the rules governing a society, then they set up political institutions representing only their narrow interests with minimal constraints on the exercise of their political power. It is also natural that such group would want to set up economic institutions that benefit it the most, and extracting as much resources as possible from the rest of the society is among the most beneficent ways to do so. The

* Corresponding author: R. Mussa, r.musa@apa.kz

resources these economic institutions generate enable the group to build armies and security forces to defend that very narrow distribution of political power, which is the representation of the extractive nature of political and economic institutions. Extractive political and economic institutions support each other and tend to persist, because the small group at the top of that structure becomes the only beneficiaries of its working and has the whole interests and power to defend it. The majority of the society then becomes losers whose resources are disproportionately confiscated, who would not have any incentives to invest into the property or invent technological innovations to create new economic activities, because all of that might get compensated by all-powerful ruling minority, all of this leading to general economic backwardness of the society.

Furthermore, even if the usurping group gets subverted or just replaced by the rebels or new leaders, it would leave that group at the top of extractive institutions with all powers to benefit from the working of such system. This causes extractive political and economic institutions to durably persist for a lasting period of time, a phenomenon that Acemoglu and his co-authors call a “vicious circle”, meaning that the initial unequal distribution of power gets so deeply entrenched into the society that it replicates itself over and over again throughout the history.


In this paper we will be arguing that the phenomenon of vicious circle is responsible for the contemporary authoritarian persistence and economic backwardness in Egypt. That is, extractive political institutions yield extractive economic institutions which in turn support the former, and in the Egyptian case it became very hard to break that circle for the certain reasons. That interplay of extractive political and economic institutions shortly amounts to what Acemoglu and his co-authors call the critical juncture hypothesis of political development.

Theory

(a) *Institutions as the fundamental cause of development*

Critical juncture hypothesis is the theory within the fields of both political economy and development economics, pursuing to answer the very general question of the divergent economic growth around the world, which brings one states to economic prosperity, and the others to poverty. It adheres to the North and Thomson’s classical view that the fundamental explanation of such comparative growth is differences in institutions (*North et al, 1973*). So first, it is necessary to dwell on the question why institutions matter for political and economic development.

According to Douglas North ‘institutions are the rules of the game in a society or more broadly are the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction... (hence) they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic (*North, 1982, p.3*).’ Adhering to this definition, the structure of property rights and the presence and perfection of markets are the economic institutions of a society determining its economic outcomes. Dwelling on this, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson elucidate that in case of not having secure property rights, individuals would not have any incentives to invest in human or physical capital or adopt better technologies; the functioning of market allocates resources to the most efficient uses, which determine who receives revenues, profits and residual rights of control. All these economic institutions not only shape the aggregate growth potential of the economy, but the future distribution of resources. In other words, they determine not only the size of the overall pie, but also how this pie is going to be divided among individuals and groups in society. It can be described like this schematically (the subscript t is about the current period and $t+1$ is about the future)” (*Acemoglu et. al, 2001*):



According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, the most important for understanding different economic outcomes, like prosperity and poverty, is the fact that economic institutions are endogenous, in the sense of being the collective choices of the society, dependent on their economic consequences. However, there cannot be any guarantees that all groups and individuals will go for the same set of economic institutions, because different institutions result in different distribution of resources. As a result, in a typical situation a


conflict of interests is inevitable among various individuals and groups about the choice of economic institutions in a society. So how are the equilibrium institutions determined? This depends on the political power. Even though the efficiency of one set of institutions relative to another may play a role, political power will be the arbiter. Which group possesses more political power is more likely to establish the set of economic institutions that suits it better (Acemoglu et al, 2001).

Therefore, this leads to:



Based on this, the subfield of political economy asserts that understanding politics is crucial for explaining world inequality, but it is important to see that the generated economic resources are always used in

defending the existing sets of political and economic institutions, thus, the distribution of resources is mainly what constitutes political power. Schematically this is:



The figure above represents the first part of a major idea of the critical juncture hypothesis: political and economic development are always interlinked and evolve jointly, there cannot be any reciprocal causality between them. Their interplay is durable and it creates path-dependency, meaning that the same set of institutions tends to persist over long period of time, when only a sufficiently large change in political power is necessary to cause political change. This is where the second part of the critical juncture hypothesis comes: only particular historical “shocks”, “like changes in technologies and the international environment that modify the balance of political power in society can lead to major changes in political power and political institutions and therefore in economic institutions and economic growth” (Acemoglu et al, 2001, p.392-393).

(b) Critical junctures and inclusive institutions

Critical juncture is some time period

during which major historical event or confluence of historical factors occur disrupting the existing balance of political or economic power in one or many societies. The examples of such crucial time periods “might include the early stages of colonization for former colonies, the aftermath of independence or the founding of a nation, the epoch of the collapse of feudalism for Western European nations, the age of industrialization (i.e., the nineteenth century), and the periods of significant ideological shocks such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, or the rise of Islam” (Acemoglu et al, 2001, p.393). Critical junctures disrupt the existing balance of political power, because during those major historical events usually new sources of power appear, igniting the struggle over them between the ruling elites and the opponents. It is when small institutional differences in a society start mattering, because the initial political and economic institutions prior to the arrival of critical

junction period are going to define how the juncture is generally going to play out for that country. Once political and economic institutions get established as a result of the effect of small institutional differences at critical historical junctures of time, their interplay again creates path-dependency, meaning that the same set of institutions tends to persist over long period of time (*Acemoglu et. al, 2002*).

When describing the interaction of institutional factors with critical time periods, the historical development of concrete countries is usually provided in the works of the theory's proponent. For example, the political and economic development of England serves as a case of how the broad coalition of the groups of people representing the various occupations can reach some sort of consensus over the institutions allowing all those groups to have a say in the political decision-making, and in the same time impose constraints which do not let one group amass too much power.

It is generally well-agreed that the monarchical power in England in the beginning of the Modern period was weaker comparing to those of French and Spanish monarchs, and especially the kingdoms of the East Europe. The pillars of traditional feudal order there was somewhat shaken first by the Black death of the XIV century which created labor shortage, and hence freed peasants from some of the compulsory labor services, and then by the king Henry VIII' confiscation of monasteries a century later in an attempt to weaken the Church and centralize state. This situation made it difficult for Henry VIII" successors to deal with the aristocracy comprising the Parliament that had some constraints on the power of the King in such crucial issue as taxation. With the monarch's grip on the feudal order being weak, some tendencies in a society, like the increased importance of trade and commercial agriculture, started growing up mainly in opposition to the Crown, because monarch's ability to freely meddle into any affairs of the state, like the one of granting trade monopolies, was inhibiting the normal functioning of the market (*Acemoglu et. al, 2008*). The arrival of critical juncture – the expansion of Atlantic trade routes and colonization only intensified these tendencies, as they started creating the class of wealthy merchants with few links

to the Crown, demanding the restriction of royal prerogatives and fairer political and economic rules. The attempts of the kings James I and Charles I to turn these arrangements to their own purposes and strengthen the absolutism in England only faced the fierce opposition of commercial aristocracy, who had got wealthier and more powerful through trade, finally bringing about the English Civil War of 1642–1651, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the general uprooting of absolutist institutions (*Benedictow, 2004*).

The outcome of this critical juncture meant the shift from extractive political institutions to the ones widely distributing power between and guaranteeing a say in the political decision-making to all groups of the broad coalition of merchants, commercial landowners and manufacturers unified against absolutism. That broad coalition naturally would have vital interests in such political institutions having higher degree of inclusivity and establishing playing level field – the rule of law and constraints on the exercise of power for all groups at the table, so none of them would become too much influential and subvert the others. This is the representation of inclusive political institutions, allowing the broad coalition to set up inclusive economic institutions, the ones guaranteeing secure property rights, the freedom of contract and exchange, the law and order, so all the groups could make profits from their own economic activities without fearing that they would be illegitimately confiscated (*Diamond, 1997*).

With the rule of law involving legal predictability and stability, it becomes no wonder that many people in England being able to manage their affairs more effectively wanted to create new businesses and make fortunes for themselves, especially by applying technologies and science. Inclusive political and economic institutions shape people' behavior and incentivize them to use best of their skills and knowledge to pursue self-interests. As Acemoglu and Robinson say, it should therefore be no surprise that the Industrial Revolution of XVIII and XIX centuries started and made its biggest strides in England, where inclusive political and economic institutions provided corresponding necessary incentives for its citizens (*Acemoglu et. al, 2012*).

Acemoglu and Robinson call such an

interplay a “virtuous circle”, as it creates a longtime process of positive feedback for the majority of population, not just for the minority of it. “Virtuous circle” is the political and economic development path associated with the well-being and stability of modern democracies, because the rule of law opens the door for greater participation in the political process and greater inclusivity, as it powerfully introduces the idea that people should be equal not only before the law but also in the political system (*Acemoglu et al, 2012*). Undermining that principle and setting up a repressive dictatorship in an attempt to suppress the greater inclusivity would disrupt the existing balance of power, something that the very working of the system naturally tends to resist to.

(c) *Extractive institutions and vicious circle*

Even though the outcome of the ever-present political conflict over resources and domination in society remains to be highly contingent, from the England’s history of political and economic development Acemoglu and Robinson draw a conclusion that some factors become of paramount importance when critical juncture arrives:

“Three factors greatly facilitated the emergence of more inclusive political institutions following the Glorious Revolution... The first was new merchants and businessmen wishing to unleash the power of creative destruction from which they themselves would benefit; these new men were among the key members of the revolutionary coalitions and did not wish to see the development of yet another set of extractive institutions that would again prey on them... The second was the nature of the broad coalition that had formed in both cases. For example, the Glorious Revolution wasn’t a coup by a narrow group or a specific narrow interest, but a movement backed by merchants, industrialists, the gentry, and diverse political groupings... The third factor relates to the history of English political institutions. They created a background against which new, more inclusive regimes could develop... there was (*always*) a tradition of parliaments and power sharing...” (*Acemoglu et al., 2012, p.362*)

Therefore, we would expect states that prior to the critical juncture period, like the opening of Atlantic trade routes, exhibited the institutional differences running contrary

to those three criteria, to embark upon the political and economic development path not associated with democracy and prosperity.

For example, in the XVI century the English monarchs could not monopolize the trade with the Americas, but other European monarchs could. Spanish monarchy throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period had been powerful enough to maintain a tight grip on both the feudal order and the aristocracy:

“After the Americas had been discovered, Isabella and Ferdinand (*Spanish monarchs*) organized trade between their new colonies and Spain via a guild of merchants in Seville. These merchants controlled all trade and made sure that the monarchy got its share of the wealth of the Americas. There was no free trade with any of the colonies... The narrow, monopolized base of this trade meant that no broad class of merchants could emerge via trading opportunities with the colonies...” (*Acemoglu et al, 2012, p.219*).

Monarchies which entered the early modern period while being indeed absolutist, in the words of Barrington Moore, had broken the back of the independent nobility (Moore 1966), turning it into its faithful flunkies. For instance, the Cortes, the assembly of the Spanish aristocracy, did not have any power to exert even a modicum of control over the monarch, and its function was mainly consultative. In all the situations with the monarchy being all-mighty, none of economic activities could grow in opposition to the Crown, but was dominated by monopolies and serfdom pumping out resources upward for the benefit of only those at the top. In Spain, France, Austro-Hungaria and Russia where absolutism thrived at that time the serfdom tied labor force to the land and hence would not allow free labor market to emerge; similarly, trade monopolies would remove unnecessary competition by preventing others from entering business occupations. Those are the representation of the extractive political arrangements made by small minority – the monarchy in this case - which had concentrated all power narrowly in its hands, and then augment its wealth at the expense of the many (*Acemoglu et al., 2006*).

The existence of strong absolutist monarchy in Spain and France at the moment of the arrival of critical juncture in

XVI-XVII centuries – the onset of the Colonization era - meant that it could not disrupt the existing balance of power there as the appeared new sources of economic power were quickly seized by and organized for the benefit of the already deeply entrenched extractive institutions, at it happened with Atlantic trade routes which got monopolized by trade guilds of the Crown in these countries. It meant that this critical juncture could not bring about successful political transition, as three characteristics necessary for that – the wide class of independent entrepreneurs, the broad coalition against existing rule and some traditions of power sharing – are the representations of *weakened* extractive political and economic institutions, something that had not occurred in Spain and France prior to the Colonization era. The arrival of this critical juncture only meant the perseverance of extractive institutions there, as they got re-boosted by new sources of economic power, and could continue its extractive rule – to narrowly concentrate power in its hands, augment the wealth at the expense of the many and oppose creative destruction. For this reason, Acemoglu and Robinson say that the interplay of two factors, small institutional differences and critical juncture shapes the history of institutional development in societies, which account for the divergent patterns of political and economic development around the world (*Acemoglu et. al, 2001*).

Case study

The patterns of the vicious circle reproduced themselves very clearly in an example of political development of modern Egypt. Similar to other nations Egypt also went through common critical junctures, like the Industrial revolution and the decay of the colonization era, and had its own revolutions, like that of 1952 that overthrew the monarchy there, but all these did not bring about the results similar to those of England in 1688 for the reason predicted by the vicious circle - because from the beginning extractive political and economic institutions had been deeply entrenched into the Egyptian society.

In the beginning of the early modern period Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire, which was an absolutist monarchy similar to the Spanish Empire of that times. In the XIX century, even though the Egyptian

ruler Muhammad Ali continued paying an annual tax to the Ottomans, he managed to make his country highly autonomous, inside it concentrating all political power in his hands, in fact creating an absolutist monarchy inside another absolutist empire. All agricultural land, industries and trade guilds were under strict state control, and a purely consultative and symbolic Parliament was set up there too. The presence of any independent entrepreneurs was not tolerated. As any absolutist rule, it led to the state centralization and hence to the law and order, ensuing some economic growth in the country.

When the British conquered Egypt in 1882 and imposed free trade rules on it, the prior absence of the broad coalition of traders, landowners and industrialists led to the further concentration of all land and businesses in the hands of a very few groups primarily affiliated with the house of Muhammad Ali in the past and Turkish-Circassian elites. The British aimed at making Egypt the market oriented only to the cotton production, for that reason, the domination in Egypt of a few firms which would block the entry of other efficient economic rivals and new technologies, suited them. This widespread monopoly went well into the independent era of Egypt, now backed up by the political power of the monarchy restored following the British's withdrawal from the country in 1922. As before, the King retained tremendous executive and legislative powers. Since his and the business elites' powers were largely unconstrained, they lacked any real incentives to bring economic prosperity to ordinary Egyptians, rather focusing on pursuing their self-interests like overcoming inter-elite fighting.

Monarchy in Egypt was overthrown in 1952 revolution led by the Free Officers Movement, whose leaders Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser aimed at reaching the economic growth and the resurgence of their nation through reducing income inequalities, which, they believed, would win for them the support of the Egyptian majority. After the revolution new government indeed implemented many actions toward social justice, abolishing old trade and land monopolies, allowing small and medium-sized enterprises to rise, as well as hugely extending public education and

public health programs. But that was a socialist economy in which state played a central role. In addition, as in the past the narrow distribution of political power within the executive government, especially in the hands of the President, without sharing it with any other political body remained to be the main tool for executing all these state policies. President Nasser had been even openly rejecting the idea of establishing any alternative political party, preferring Egypt to be a one-party state (*Brownlee, 2007*).

After his death, the absence of political accountability led to the gradual decline of the socialist rhetoric, and the Egyptian eternal market left to its own devices became increasingly dominated by the politically and economically powerful. Over the years, the businessmen got more and more involved with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), and many of them even started getting appointed to key government posts (*Farah 2009*). Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak under whose tenures that practice became common, were claiming that the expertise of businesspeople in the private sector was particularly necessary for the successful implementation of the IMF and World Bank's economic reforms. However, once appointed the business minded officials managed to implement through state regulation policies restricting the entry to the sectors of the economy closely related to their interests. For example, among such businessmen-politicians was Ahmed Ezz, who by way of employing state protection for his steel industry company, and seizing government contracts and large bank loans without putting up any collateral took up to 70 percent of all Egypt's steel production (*Sfakianakis, 2004*). At the same time as running his firm, he held a high position in the NDP, like the chairman of the People's Assembly Budget and Planning Committee.

The economic reforms in Egypt at the 1990s were aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy and building up a free and competitive market by privatizing state-owned assets. But once more in the absence of the level playing field, politically connected businessmen simply got an ownership over state monopolies and turn them into privately owned monopolies. As it has been noted by one of the researchers in this regard:

"This consolidation of business

interests and representation in government deepened political and economic inequalities while cementing the power of business elites by wielding them to the centers of power... For the first time since 1952, the government has abandoned all pretense of populism and that the configuration of power is titled solidly toward a tiny elite, that was nurtured and protected by the state" (*Farah, 2009, p.12*).

The cumulative results of the 1952 revolution which rather than being led by a broad coalition of interests was a military coup, and hence it did not pursue establishing the rule of law and level playing field in the first place. But since these things have been practically non-existent from the beginning it becomes no wonder that the socialist rhetoric of the Nasserist era gradually got shaken off, and the Egyptian market started working for the benefit of politically and economically powerful. The connection between business and government is highly lucrative for both, and while the businessmen with such connections receive privileged treatment, the average Egyptians mostly must embrace a culture of lying and bribery in order to succeed in their careers either in public or private sectors. These impediments have a chilling effect on doing business leading to fewer firms operating within Egypt which causes unemployment (*International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2013*). Unemployment coupled with the poor public services, all of that rendered by the corruption, led to dire poverty, which since the Hosni Mubarak's ascent to power up to the present days ranged between 20-40%, according to some World Bank Data. The average incomes in Egypt amount to only 12 percent of those in the United States, as well as life expectancy being almost 10 years shorter in the former comparing to the latter.

The dire poverty of so many ordinary citizens was among the main causes of the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Egypt. By using the critical juncture hypothesis, we have already said that the roots of that poverty lie in the political factors, in the fact that Egypt never has had a revolution done by the broad coalition of different groups, which only would have the nested interests in imposing the rule of law and level playing field. Egyptians demonstrators who protested in Cairo at 2011 themselves recognized that all their economic problems fundamentally stem

from their lack of political rights, as they acknowledged through their posts at social media which later were many times reproduced by different news agencies. There are just some of those taken from the “Yahoo! News” news website:

“We are suffering from corruption, oppression and bad education. We are living amid a corrupt system which has to change... I hope that by the end of this year we will have an elected government and that universal freedoms are applied and that we put an end to the corruption that has taken over this country” (“Yahoo! News”, 2011).

When the demonstrators started to put forth the actions that the government in their opinions had to deal with first, many of those lists started with the demands for political change, while the economic issues like raising the incomes got to be implemented later. As protesting Egyptians themselves acknowledge, the poverty in which majority of them languish was brought on them by purpose, by tiny-elite-monopolized political institutions, that is why the distribution of power in society had to change first. This corresponds to the major statement of the critical juncture hypothesis that it is the politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has (Acemoglu et al., 2012).

Delving a bit deeper, the critical

conjuncture hypothesis would explain that Egypt is economically so poor because it was governed by a narrow elite that concentrated all political power, and then used it to set up economic institutions extracting resources for their benefit from the rest of the society. Because the power of ex-president Mubarak and his cronies was unchecked, they naturally had more incentives for amassing personal wealth, like \$70 billion of Mubarak, rather than providing decent public services and the equity of opportunity in their country, as the majority of Egyptians themselves understand.

For example, look at the map and the accompanying diagram below (both taken from the *Economist*, 2011) showing the proceedings of the Arab Spring throughout the region. Egypt, alongside Libya, are the only countries where the protesters succeeded in toppling the regimes. Despite of the fact that in the other countries, most notably in Libya, Syria and Yemen, the regimes are still clinging to the power, what unites all these countries is the dire patterns of the vicious circle phenomenon. The consequences of that can be seen in the form of the income inequality across the countries shown in the diagram below, and have been exemplified in a case of the Egypt events prior to 2011.






Figure 1 – The uprising outcomes and inequality level across the region

The concepts of the virtuous and vicious circles state that different patterns of institutions today are deeply rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to persist (*Acemoglu et al., 2012*). Under the strong absolutist Ottoman rule in the XVI-XIX centuries there were no chances for the broad coalition of independent tradesmen to appear, that could later, when the Ottomans got subverted by the British, demand the fair terms of political and economic game, so the newcomers were able to turn Egyptian commercial arrangements to their own profits. But exactly the same happened when the country got its independence in 1922. The prior absence of the de-facto rule of law and level playing field meant that new rulers would make more wealth for themselves by simply controlling power and then use that money to defend this set of institutions, and again in 1952 when the monarchy got overthrown, and with every president thereafter. Some leaders assuming practically unconstrained political power might be aiming at pursuing some benevolent goals, like social justice and welfare redistribution, for example like Gamal Nasser did, but as long as they rely on narrow power distribution there is always a risk of this process going in reverse from redistribution to self-enrichment, after new leaders come. The persistence of extractive political and economic institutions since the early periods of the institutional development makes it very difficult for that society to move away from them.

The part of the critical juncture hypothesis stating that combinations of extractive and inclusive institutions are generally unstable, can further explain the political development of Egypt under President Nasser (*Acemoglu et al., 2012*). It states that inclusive economic institutions supported by extractive political ones will either be transformed into extractive economic institutions to the benefit of the narrow interests that hold power, or the economic dynamism they create will destabilize the extractive political institutions. Seeing what happened after Nasser's death, it is obvious that new leadership preferred former to the latter.

Conclusion

It seems that the critical juncture hypothesis of political development can account for the contemporary authoritarian persistence and economic backwardness in Egypt. Its proposition that once society gets organized in a particular way this tends to persist and the one of the strength of the interplay between political and economic institutions constitute a compelling argument for explaining why prior to the 2011 Arab Spring uprising Egypt had not experienced major shifts toward inclusive institutions. It was because in the early stages of the institutional development of modern Egypt, the outcome of the conflict over determining institutions did not settle in favor of inclusiveness, stifling necessary factors for the reversal thereafter.

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ӨТПЕЛІ КЕЗЕҢ ГИПОТЕЗАСЫН ЕГИПЕТТЕГІ 2011 ЖЫЛҒЫ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯНЫ ТҮСІНДІРУДЕ ҚОЛДАНУ

Рустам МУСА, Әлеуметтік ғылымдар магистрі, Қазақстан Республикасы Президенті жанындағы Мемлекеттік Басқару Академиясы Ақтөбе облысы бойынша Филиалының аға оқытушысы, Ақтөбе, Қазақстан Республикасы, r.musa@apa.kz

Раушан ЕСБЕРГЕН, Экономика ғылымдарының кандидаты, Қазақстан Республикасы Президенті жанындағы Мемлекеттік Басқару Академиясы Ақтөбе облысы бойынша Филиалының Профессоры, Ақтөбе, Қазақстан Республикасы, r.esbergen@apa.kz

ГИПОТЕЗА ПЕРЕХОДНОГО ПЕРИОДА В ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ СОБЫТИЙ ЕГИПЕТСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ 2011 ГОДА

Рустам МУСА, магистр социальных наук, Старший преподаватель Филиала Академии Государственного Управления при Президенте Республики Казахстан по Актюбинской области, Актөбе, Республика Казахстан, r.musa@apa.kz

Раушан ЕСБЕРГЕН, кандидат экономических наук, Профессор Филиала Академии Государственного Управления при Президенте Республики Казахстан по Актюбинской области, Актөбе, Республика Казахстан, r.esbergen@apa.kz