

REGIONAL PLAYERS IN CENTRAL ASIA: INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

Today the Central Asian region was the focus of attention of the leading powers and international organizations, has become a wide range and composition of cooperation and at the same time, the scene of rivalry of various forces for their influence. In the first place this is due to the geostrategic importance of the region, its powerful oil-gas and other mineral resources.

Keywords: *Central Asian region, European Union, geopolitics, foreign policy.*

Аңдатпа

Бүгінде Орталық Азия аймағы жетекші алпауыт мемлекеттер мен халықаралық ұйымдардың назарын аударған, әріптестік қатысушыларының құрамы және ауқымы бойынша үлкен алаңына айналып отыр, сонымен қатар, қазіргі таңда аймақ өз ықпалын арттыру бойынша бәсекелесуші күштердің сахнасы болып отыр. Ең алдымен бұл аймақтың геосаяси маңыздылығымен, ірі мұнай – газ және өзге де минералды ресурстарымен түсіндіріледі.

Тірек сөздер: *Орталық Азия аймағы, Еуропалық Одақ, геосаясат, сыртқы саясат.*

Аннотация

Сегодня Центрально-Азиатский регион оказался в фокусе внимания ведущих держав и международных организаций, стал полем широкого по диапазону и составу участников сотрудничества и в то же время ареной соперничества различных сил за свое влияние. Прежде всего, это обусловлено геостратегической значимостью региона, его мощными нефтегазовыми и другими минерально-сырьевыми ресурсами.

Ключевые слова: *Центрально-Азиатский регион, Европейский Союз, геополитика, внешняя политика.*

Five countries of Central Asian Region (CAR) are the main territorial center of southeast part of Eurasia which area is 4 million km², and the population is more 50 million people. The states of CAR at the beginning of the 90th of the XX century entered a new stage of development. Finding of independence and an exit to the international scene as independent subjects of the international relations changed status and political value of the region.

Today the CAR is in focus of attention of the leading powers and the international organizations, as well became a cooperation field wide on the range and structure of participants and at the same time it is the arena of rivalry of various forces for the influence. First of all, it is caused by the geostrategic importance of the region, its powerful oil and gas and other mineral raw material resources. The existing asymmetry of geopolitical fields of various powers in the region bears a threat to security. The largest powers border on the CAR. Geoeconomic and geopolitical vulnerability of the CAR predetermines a tendency of increase of political and geoeconomic presence of interests of these powers in the region.

The Central Asia is a place where interests of the world powers, in particular, the EU, China, Iran, and Turkey are crossed, and these interests are not always coincided. Taking it into account, it would be useful to consider interrelation between efforts of the regional and extra regional states in creation of regional system of interaction of the world powers' sometimes competing interests.

It should be noted that the European Union as the priority purpose of the policy in the east considered, first of all, support of democratic institutes [1]. The Concept of the EU concerning the CIS was based on idea that the technical and financial aid from Europe will help economic stabilization of the new independent states, strengthening of democracy and will reduce to a minimum risk of destabilization by that. For the European Union as the result of the policy it was necessary to have

a politically and economically stable, cut-out according to the European standards of parliamentary mode, predictable space in the neighborhood, consisting from the states organized on model of the EU and cooperating among themselves.

At the very beginning of formation of a foreign and external economic policy the leaders of the republics of Central Asia had a clear understanding of that fact that Western Europe, institutes of the European community are that political and economic force which should be considered when developing strategy of foreign policy of each state.

So, for example, already in the first conceptual document “Strategy of Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as Sovereign State” in 1992 the President N. Nazarbayev noted that “the policy of entry into the world community is built taking into account a due assessment of partnership opportunities of three market system main centers – the USA, Japan and Western Europe, bearing in mind that they acted as the incentive force of an intensification of world economic communications. Interaction with them also opens a way to the international financial institutions” [2]. Thus, cooperation with the EU was understood first of all in an economic context.

Serious changes in the relations between Kazakhstan and the EU happened at the beginning of December, 1991 when it was already clear that collapse of the USSR is inevitable. On December 2, 1991 the delegation of European Parliament headed by the Chairman of the Commission on the USSR Relations M. Hoff arrived to Alma-Ata. The delegation was accepted by S. Abdildin, the Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan. The first democratic election of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan was the main political news of these days. The preliminary agreement on establishment of close and mutually advantageous contacts of the EU with Kazakhstan was reached. On December 3 the Head of the Delegation M. Hoff met the president N. Nazarbayev who was invited to a meeting with the European Parliament.

In the next weeks dynamics of events was defined by an event of enormous geopolitical importance – official abolition of the USSR. On December 16, 1991 in Brussels the extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU Member States took place. At the meeting the principles of recognition of the new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were defined. And, at last, on December 31, 1991 it was known of the joint statement of Community on recognition of the former Soviet Republics on the basis of the assurances received from them that they are ready to satisfy the conditions reflected in “The Principles of Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”. The last day 1991 can be considered date when equal from the point of view of international law the bilateral relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan (further the RK) and the European Community started.

In 1992 relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EU developed rather dynamically. An extreme interest of the European community in an intensification of the relations with Kazakhstan was obviously traced. Already on January 9, 1992 the Commission of the EU prepared information on the relations with Kazakhstan. The characteristic feature of the first year of cooperation with the EU was the versatility, i.e. the EU formed the strategy of cooperation with the CIS in a complex order, revealing the general problems and aspects of cooperation for all republics of the CIS. Such policy of the EU was justified in the first years of independence of the new states which signed standard and collective agreements with the EU. The protocol signed on February 11, 1992 between the Commission of the EU and 12 independent states of the former USSR providing the institutional mechanism of technical cooperation for 1992 was one of such documents.

On March 3, 1992, when Kazakhstan entered the UN, N. Nazarbayev accepted the next delegation of the EU Commission headed by F. Andriyassen, the Vice-Chairman. Both parties confirmed aspiration to adjustment of direct contacts. For a rising of the relations N. Nazarbayev was invited to higher level to Brussels for the solution of the corresponding circle of questions.

In April, 1992 the relations between the EU and the RK were raised to the level of inter-parliamentary contacts. On April 7, 1992 the parliamentary delegation of the RK led by S. Abdildin arrived to Strasbourg by the invitation of European Parliament. The Delegation was accepted by the President of the European Parliament E. Klepach on April 15. The parties discussed a circle of the questions representing mutual interest. Soon the Commission of the EU and the Government of

Kazakhstan signed the Memorandum of Financing that became the beginning of implementation of the TACIS Program in Kazakhstan. In September, 1992 the Coordination Bureau on implementation of the TACIS Program in Kazakhstan was created [3].

1992 came to the end with a symbolical action: a year later after disintegration of the Soviet Union the European community adopted the Declaration of heads of states and the member governments of the EU on readiness to promote process of democratization in the former USSR. Thus, interest of the EU in the new independent states accepted more certain political character.

N. Nazarbayev's visits to Germany (on September 21-23) and France (on September 23-25) became large break in the European policy of Kazakhstan in 1992. During these visits the documents which deepened economic and political cooperation of the RK with the largest states of Europe were signed. Thus, in 1992 the relations of Kazakhstan developed at two levels: with the certain European states and with the EU in general. The main result of this year was the fact that the political foundation for cooperation of the RK with the EU and its institutes was laid.

In May, 1993 the Commission of the EU published the document which contained conclusions and recommendations of rather further work of the International Fund of Technical Assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Many sections of this document were of great importance for the countries of CAR, including the Republic of Kazakhstan. In July, 1993 within implementation of the program of the help the CIS and the Commission recommendations 3 million ECU were allocated to Kazakhstan for assistance of mass privatization policy in the Republic. The following 1994 started with such important for the bilateral relations event as opening of representation of the RK at the European Union on the basis of the President N. Nazarbayev's Decree of on assignment of functions of representation of the RK at the EU on the RK Embassy in Belgium. This event gave a necessary diplomatic basis to the bilateral relations.

Thus, active contacts during 1993-1994 between the EU and Kazakhstan at various levels, including political cooperation, led to establishment of full diplomatic communications. On the agenda at the beginning of 1995 there was a question of the conclusion of the full contract. During this period the Government of the RK attached paramount significance to strengthening of ties with the European countries.

On the basis of experience of the relations with the CIS countries the Commission of the EU in the spring of 1994 developed some general provisions concerning development of the further relations between the EU, Russia and other CIS countries. On the basis of all data the Commission came to a conclusion that it was necessary to give urgently a priority to the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements covering a wide number of areas and providing gradual creation of a free trade zone. At the same time the Commission clearly expressed that Russia and other CIS countries should not consider on the accession to the EU as full partners in the near future.

The commission defined three main lines of conduct in the relations with the CIS:

- a) Strengthening of economic cooperation and addition it with other types of multilateral cooperation and long-term programs; as industrial partners the EU chose only Russia and Ukraine;
- b) Further strengthening of political cooperation; Russia and CIS ha to understand meaning of "joint foreign and defensive policy" of the EU;
- c) Development of cooperation within joint policy on internal affairs and legal questions.

On April 22, 1994 the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on providing the western help to the CIS countries. The Resolution contained requirements of trade liberalization, stabilization of currency systems, assignment for the special purposes, revision of regulations of TACIS for 1995, increase of the Commission staff. In the resolution it was emphasized that the EU gave to 78% of all help of the West to the CIS countries (54 of 85 billion dollars) during the period from September, 1990 to December, 1993. [4]

Concerning the countries of CAR during the same period (spring of 1994) the European Commission on Technical Assistance took the initiative of de - monopolization and modernization of the industry. The main goal of this project was to force emergence of new economic structures, transformation of sector and regional monopolies into competitive groups, establishment of systems on price control in the region.

On May 24, 1994 the European Union initialed, in particular, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan, and one week later – with the Kyrgyz Republic. It was supposed that official signing of these documents would take place in the next weeks. It was noted that the documents prepared for signing with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differed a little from the ones prepared for signing with Ukraine and Russia. They were formed within Directives of the European Council of October 5, 1992.

The main distinctive feature of all agreements of the EU is that they are the so-called “mixed” documents and concluded both with the Community and with its State Parties. Besides the European Parliament they must be ratified by the national parliaments of the states of the EU. As implementation of all procedures could take till two years, they stipulated that during complex ratification so-called “interim agreements” would be applied. Their coming into effect requires only approval of the European Parliament and Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the EU.

It should be noted that concerning Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreements did not have elements of a strict arrangement, as in a case with Ukraine and especially Russia. In particular, demands for strengthening of control of the nuclear industry and restriction of free trade were not made to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The trade was the basis of the signing of the Agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan. This trade was dynamically developing in the first years of independent development of the RK. In 1992–1993 exports of the EU to Kazakhstan grew up 3, 96 times more, and import – up 3, 19. Especially the trade actively developed in such spheres as mineral raw materials, plastic, jewels, metals, electrical equipment and machine-tool construction, optics. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden (at that time it was not a full participant of the EU) were the largest trade partners of Kazakhstan in 1992. In 1993 trade with Great Britain and Italy increased. The large companies and the governments of these states were interested in the fastest contractual registration of all wide range of the relations with Kazakhstan [5].

At the beginning of September, 1994 the EU Commission strengthened control of illegal import of nuclear and radioactive materials. Innovations in this area concerned also Kazakhstan which on diplomatic channels received the letter FROM the European Parliament President with an appeal to pay attention to questions of nuclear non-proliferation. The answer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RK was that Kazakhstan was faithful to the obligations to IAEA within the NPT and the START, besides fight against nuclear smuggling, the EU began a full-scale offensive against organized crime. On September 8, so-called Berlin declaration was accepted. At the same time the Commission of the EU took a number of anti-dumping measures in trade with the CIS countries.

In 1994 revision of the system of general preferences (SGP), i.e. measures in the field of trade with developing countries began. The European Commission entered three-year measures of regulation of trade for 1995–1997 with full introduction of new system in 1998. It meant that some types of goods lost preferential customs discounts. It affected also the CAR concerning mineral fertilizers and production of the general metallurgy. Thus, proclaiming the principles of free trade and competition, the help of the CIS, the European Union simultaneously started taking measures for protection of the market against production from the CIS. Thereby the positive effect from technical assistance programs was reduced to a minimum.

At the summit in Essen on October 9, 1994 the State Parties of the European Union accepted “The Document on Strategy” which was urged to define policy of the Union for some years ahead. The central place in the document was taken by the new strategy of the EU aimed at cooperation and integration into the Union of the states of the Central and Eastern Europe. Besides this region the EU gave great value to cooperation with the Mediterranean states. Thus, the majority of the states of the CIS including the CAR remained on the periphery of the European economic and political interests.

On December 28, 1994 the Council of Europe coordinated the position reflecting the general strategy of the EU for steel. It was addressed, first of all, to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and concerned establishment of import quotas of production of steel from these countries for 1995–1996. It was coordinated that the quota for the former Soviet Union would be divided between Russia,

Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The quota increased for 35% in 1995 and 15% in 1996. It included 330 000 tons 5% from which fell to the share of Kazakhstan (6% – Russia and 35% – Ukraine). The increase in a quota was especially important for Kazakhstan, whose steel export to EU countries in 1994 fell from 131 thousand tons to 23 thousand tons that was lower than a level of 1992. Changes in the European policy on steel could be regarded as a positive signal in anticipation of conclusion of agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan [6].

It is necessary to consider strategy of the EU not only in relation to the CIS in general, but also to Central Asia. It was based on the following postulates:

- transition of the former Soviet Republics to independence was especially difficult for the states of Central Asia;
- The EU had important interests in Central Asia which were connected with geopolitics and economy, development in the region of the energy sector was especially important for the EU;
- The EU saw achievement of the purposes in the region through development of democratic institutes, reduction of conflict potential, implementation of economic reforms;
- The EU connected the safety with opportunity to influence decision-making in an energy and production of mineral resources [7].

In the special communiqué prepared by the Commission of the EU detailed interpretation of interests of the EU in the Central Asian region and vision of the relations of the European Union and Central Asia from Brussels are given. In the document huge value for world economy of the forthcoming operation of oil and gas resources in east part of the Caspian Sea is emphasized; concern in destiny of democratic institute and slipping of at least three republics of the region to authoritarianism are expressed, and possibility of Russia to keep further the influence, “a challenge to which it is thrown already down in Tajikistan” [8] is put into question.

Then in the communiqué it was emphasized that the EU already became the influential player on a Central Asian scene. Europe was the only largest potential market for Central Asian producers of power raw materials, besides the CIS. Among external factors which the EU had to consider in the policy in the region, in the document were called as Russia (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as objects of its influence); the war in Afghanistan (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were involved); the United States, whose policy was aimed at the development of Kyrgyzstan as an experienced model for the region; Turkey, which carried out rapprochement with the region in cultural, economic and military areas; China, which intended to strengthen the influence in the region through trade; Iran, Pakistan and India seeking to develop the relations with the states of the region, but their opportunity were limited.

In the communiqué it was noted that only Uzbekistan had an understanding of capacity of the EU as political partner. In foreign policy of Kazakhstan orientation to Russia and the United States was too strong. Further authors draw a conclusion: considering that only 50% of the gas consumed by the European countries had the Russian origin, the voice of the European Union had to be heard at the solution of such problems, as production of hydrocarbons, construction of gas pipelines and definition of the status of the Caspian Sea.

When determining the strategy concerning the region authors of the document urged the European Union to consider such factors as possibilities of Central Asia with the population of 52 million people as the market of consumer goods of the European origin. It was indicated also the need to consider ethnic communications and presence of the German and Greek population in Kazakhstan. They call such events as distribution of the split materials and drug trafficking, and the conflict in Tajikistan as threats for stability of the region and the European - Central Asian cooperation [9].

Thus, by the end of 1994 there were all prerequisites and conditions – economic, political and diplomatic – for full cooperation of the CAR with the European Union. This need was insistently felt by both parties. The EU already had the developed strategy for the policy for the new independent states in the territory of the former Soviet Union. If necessary it adapted in relation to the Central Asian region and the certain states. As it was noted above, important political and economic interests of the EU in the region were the cornerstone of the European strategy and it was openly declared in official documents. It is necessary to emphasize extremely active, offensive nature of the European

strategy in the CIS. Thanks to this factor rather fast passing of a preparatory stage in the relations between the EU and the countries of CAR became possible. In turn, the states of CAR did everything possible to lift the relations with the EU on higher level, to open the representations in Brussels, to accept programs for cooperation and technical assistance, to create the maximum conditions for their realization.

By the end 1994 – the beginning of 1995 both parties closely came nearer to signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, to be exact, the whole complex of documents. For Kazakhstan this event occurred on January 23, 1995 in Brussels where the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev arrived. The document was signed by the President of Kazakhstan and the Chairman of the EU Council Alain Juppé. Together with the Agreement they signed a temporary contract on trade which purpose was involving trade and economic part of the Agreement. In the performance at the time of signing of these documents the President of Kazakhstan noted that the CIS countries should follow the example of the European Union which is based on four freedoms: free movement of goods, labor, services and capital.” We see in the EU, said N. Nazarbayev, a worthy example for imitation, a sample of the main, most perspective and effective direction of the economic and political integration turned into the XXI century” [10].

The signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the RK and the EU and related documents captured practically all contact areas of mutual interests of Kazakhstan, the European states and their institutes. Behind there was a preparatory stage after which the signed documents opened the road to dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation. However it was clear from the very beginning that the economic and political weight of the parties is incommensurable. And if one party (Kazakhstan) obviously could not use fully the advantages given by the Agreement in view of the objective economic and technological backwardness, other party presented by powerful industrial powers had an opportunity for the most effective use of the Kazakhstan market. There was a collision of two tendencies generated by a texture of interests of Kazakhstan and the European corporations. Kazakhstan hoped for serious investments from the EU which could raise the economics in rather short time; the European countries did not wish to invest money in economics of Kazakhstan until the principles, laws and rules used in the EU were approved in the RK. All this found reflection in the Agreement which opened the road to the European investments into Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and with another it forced to work in the economic, trade and legislative policy in compliance with the European standards.

At the same time, in the European political circles in 1995 they realized that unconditional following to the western recipes of economics reforming conducted to growth of social tension, threatened political stability in the CIS countries and created, eventually, threat of the European stability and safety which providing was a main goal of the European Union.

In April, 1995 France as the Chairman of the EU Council, made statement in the European Parliament for policy in relation to the CIS. A. Lamasyur noted in the statement that the republics of Central Asia still had the problem of human rights violation, especially in Tajikistan. In this regard France insisted on strict implementation of the Pact on Stability adopted on March 20, 1995 in Paris. But the main problem, to which the European Commission paid attention, was a development of democracy in the countries of the former USSR. For this purpose the Commission suggested to revise the TACIS Program for giving of bigger flexibility to it, but thus having kept its democratic orientation. The German social democrats raised a question of situation in Kazakhstan after dissolution of parliament. They insisted on impossibility of implementation of the Agreement between the EU and the RK in the conditions of the parliament absence. The representatives of Spain joined this position after they made a trip on the CIS countries as a part of delegation of the European Parliament. The Swedish left insisted that the EU had to keep a firm position and not make a compromise in questions of human rights, anywhere: in Russia, Kazakhstan or Turkey. However, also the balanced estimates sounded. So, the famous sovietologist E.Carrerd’Ancos emphasized that it was necessary to create bases for dialogue with the CIS countries, despite failures in development of democracy. As a result of discussions the European Parliament adopted the resolution in which procedure of ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan was postponed until in

the country free elections were not held. The important principle was brought in the resolution: a condition of implementation of the Partnership Agreements was observance of human rights and rights of minorities, and a main objective of the Agreements was the help in transition to market economy.

In June, 1995 the Commission of the European Union approved the project of strategy concerning the states of Central Asia. In the project first of all importance of preservation of stability in the region was emphasized. This project was prepared at the initiative of the member of the Commission of H. Van den Brook. The region was a value for the European Union first of all thanks to the natural resources. However in the project difficulty of transformation of the region and reforming of its economy was emphasized. The contribution of the EU seemed in the project as active support of creation of the indicative democratic organizations, assistance to reduction of scales of the conflicts and promotion of economic reforms. In the project the criterion of political conditionality, first of all concerning Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was used. Concerning Kazakhstan the demand about the conclusion of the intermediate agreement on trade and ratification of the Partnership Agreement was made. Thus, the project was in a conflict with decisions of the EU member states parliaments to postpone ratification of the Agreement because of doubts concerning democratic processes in Kazakhstan. Authors of the project of strategy considered this circumstance, but insisted that the delay of the agreement implementation did not disturb negotiations and implementation of sectorial agreements on steel and trade in radioactive materials. In November, 1996 the European Commission prepared a final version of the Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of nuclear safety.

It is impossible to consider policy of the European Union out of the general context of all problems connected with safety and geo-strategy of the West concerning the CIS. These are such problems as expansion of NATO, control of the nuclear weapon and disarmament, "Partnership for Peace" and cooperation of the states of Central Asia with NATO, a problem of the West European Union and some other. All this complex of questions of international policy and safety inevitably left a mark on the relations of the countries of CAR with Europe.

It was such a general political background on which cooperation between the countries of CAR and the West European countries in 1995-1997 developed. The differentiated relation as with the European alliance in general, and the certain states of Europe, on the one hand, and the states of CAR with another became its characteristic. First of all they were Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

Especially it is necessary to pay attention to political aspect of the relations of Kazakhstan with the European Union and the certain European Union countries. They were not as politicized as the Kazakhstan-American relations, but in certain cases as it was in 1995, the EU did attempts to influence political processes in Kazakhstan. But it is necessary to stipulate that the political relations between the RK and the EU developed in much more reserved forms than with some states of the near and far abroad. It in many respects explains both an economic and geostrategic non-involvement of the EU in Central Asia and actually in Kazakhstan.

Apparently, if economic and geostrategic interests of the EU in the region were stronger, intervention of the European Union in domestic policy of Central Asia would be more effective. However in general strategy of the EU is part of the general strategy of the western industrial states directed first of all on ensuring the national interests. In relation to the Kazakhstan and European relations they are understood as interest of the EU in preservation of stability in Kazakhstan and other countries of CAR, carrying out of deep economic, social and political reforms in them which have to strengthen stability and predictability of the new independent states. On the other side politicians of the EU repeatedly emphasized interest of the Union in resources of Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan, in use of power and communication opportunities of the region. Activity of the EU during 1991–1997 was directed on realization of these purposes; first of all it concerned the Caspian Sea.

According to the European strategists, the Caspian region should be considered in the context of interests of NATO as the zone getting under action of the purposes and the principles of the Washington Agreement and New Strategic Concept (1991). According to these documents the

states of the region were considered as part of a conflict zone on the southern flank of NATO and got to the sphere of activity of the Southern command of Alliance. From the strategic point of view, thus, these states were considered as important for safety of Alliance that was recorded in the relevant documents and directives of NATO [11].

The German authors Erhard and Tvirt call the European Union the second important political force which intends to play an own role in the Caspian region and has the interests here. The EU is characterized today as not military power which in recent years has been making efforts to develop own collective foreign and defensive policy. Starting point in this direction, as these experts consider, is activity of the European commission on development of uniform European power policy and ensuring energy security of the EU. All this has a direct relation to the Caspian region.

The most essential defect of policy of the EU in the Caspian region, as these authors consider, is lack of coherent political strategy. It means that various aspects of strategic approach of the EU offered by the European Commission in the Caspian region actually are shelved in the Council of Europe or significantly emasculated. The reasons of it lie, first, that in this board there is no common point of view on future power supply of Europe and on its interrelation with problems of safety and ecology; secondly, national interests of the certain states prevail over all-European, and interests of oil and gas concerns are put over the national; thirdly, the EU stakes first of all on logic of the market relations and economic feasibility at decision-making that is strongly interfered by a divergence in estimates of hydrocarbons reserves on the Caspian Sea, high investment expenses, extremely slow processes of transformation in the states of the region and the high conflict potential and, at last, low estimates of growth prospects of need of the European economy in export of hydrocarbons.

From the political point of view the EU places emphasis on avoiding creation of any anti-Russian alliances in the region, and sees future implementation of the interests within close cooperation and partnership with Russia. However the German experts emphasize that in the short term interests of the EU lie not in the Caspian or Black Sea regions, but in ensuring the expansion to the east. Only then the EU will be able to influence more effectively decrease in conflict potential both in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia [12].

OSCE is one more international institute which is directly entering a circle interested in the relations with the Central Asian countries. The mention that Central Asia represents an integral part of system of the European safety was essential point of the major documents of this organization in new post-confrontational conditions, first of all in the Parisian Charter of 1990. All further strategy of the organization within the 1990th was based on this point. Emphasis in the policy of OSCE was placed on implementation of preventive measures to avoid the local conflicts and the armed opposition, and also the organization of peacekeeping missions.

In estimates of development prospects of relations with the Caspian states it was emphasized that they cannot be considered as potential candidates for reception for NATO or the European Union under any circumstances. Their participation in OSCE should be considered as one of channels for strengthening of influence of Europe in the Caspian and Central Asian region. All these institutes – NATO, the EU and OSCE can serve one purpose: to promote strengthening of independence of the young states of the region and formation here of the long-term and stable democratic modes. In this regard the European analysts do not have any doubts in the necessity of activity of these organizations in the Caspian and Central Asian region in the near-term perspective. However they emphasize that the Russian factor is a sensitive place of this policy.

Thus, the European policy for Kazakhstan and other countries of the Caspian region will be held in the long term on their gradual involvement in the course of the all-European strategy which is based on gradual strengthening of the European financial and political institutions in the region, use of the internal political processes connected with democratization of the state models in the countries of the region, involvement of OSCE for the solution of ecological, economic and political tasks.

This policy of the EU leaves a place as for coincidence of interests with the countries of the region, and for contradictions. It is obvious that creation of climate of stability under the European roof is equitable to interests of the large investors interested in accurately established frame conditions as international legal base for their activity on the Caspian region. But it does not mean that such policy

cannot from time to time conflict to private interests of the separate international consortiums which have participants – countries of CAR. There is one more fact that causes collisions of interests. It is aspiration of Europeans to put all transactions in the Caspian region on “a legal basis” that in reality can be a complete control over oil activity on the Caspian Sea from the EU.

It is not a secret that so far the policy of the EU in the Caspian region was in a shadow of policy of large international oil cartels and the United States which represented their interests. In this regard the policy of the USA is perceived often as the general strategy of the West. The EU has own political and economic interests in the Caspian region. A main goal of the European states is preservation of stability in the region in the conditions of which they could increase the political and economic presence. The European states express discontent that their companies have no such individual share in joint projects or comparable with it, as American.

Thus, the first collision of interests of the European and American interests on the Caspian Sea is already designated, where Europeans demand the rights for development of resources of the region, equal with the American companies. Further, the German social democrats, speaking about interests of the EU, as an indispensable condition of stability expose the requirement to consider interests of all the states which are somehow involved in a solution of the problem of the Caspian energy resources. The list of these countries includes China, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan besides eight republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia, Turkey, the USA and the EU. However all policy of the USA is directed on isolation of Iran from the solution of the Caspian problem unlike the European states` policy which carries on “critical dialogue” with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The anti-Russian policy of Washington on minimization of influence of Moscow in the region is being developed in the same direction, and Europeans do not accept it.

But at last, the manner in which the USA declared the region “a zone of the strategic and vital interests” cannot be pleasant to the European countries which are sincerely sure that energy resources of the Caspian region have to serve interests of the united Europe from Atlantic to the Urals.

Thus, the essence of contradictions which can arise between the USA, on the one hand, and other states of the EU – with another, in a zone of the Caspian region is reduced to that Europe will increase requirements about creation of equal frame conditions for itself and other European countries at the favorable mode of protection of investments, stability and cooperation. However to develop and to support such a favorable investment climate in the Caspian region, it is necessary to have power and geopolitical influence of global scale. But the states of the EU do not have such kind of influence as the United States does. It is quite probable that imaginary and true contradictions between the EU and the USA will smooth out to stand together for protection of interests of the industrial world which needs a new inflow of energy resources. It can be understood as uniform strategy of the West concerning future of the Caspian region.

For the republics of the Central Asia, in our opinion, it is advisable strengthen the European activity on the Caspian Sea for a number of reasons. The reasons are the following:

Within the integration concept of the CAR and multi vectored foreign policy strengthening of positions of the European Union would be desirable in the context of creation of a counterbalance to excessive influence of the USA and Russia, and China – in the long term perspective.

Economic involvement of the European states in the Caspian region would promote an intensification of the economic relations between the CAR and the EU in general, fuller implementation of economic programs of the EU for assistance to the local republics and their further expansion.

The CAR states, in the person of EU countries, as well as other producers of energy resources in the region, would receive the guaranteed consumer of the production for some decades ahead within creation of the United European Power System that is provided by the Power Charter Contract.

Connection of power systems of the EU and the Caspian region can be well reflected in development of communications and the general economic level of the countries of CAR.

Active cooperation with the European countries will promote strengthening of stability in the former Soviet Union, on the one hand, and on another - sharp reduction of confrontation risk.

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Дата поступления статьи в редакцию 30.03.2016