

ЭКОНОМИКА ECONOMY ЭКОНОМИКА

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE AND REGULATORY QUALITY IN KAZAKHSTAN

Aizhana*
MALDYNOVA

PhD, Postdoctoral Researcher, Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University, Almaty, Kazakhstan, aizhanam@gmail.com, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6546-378>

Nazgul
AIDARGALIYEVA

PhD, associate professor, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Department of Finance, Astana, Kazakhstan, aidargaliyeva@enu.kz, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7958-6854>

Valentina
GERASIMENKO

DSc (Economics), professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Department of Marketing, Moscow, Russian Federation, vv_gerasimenko@mail.ru, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9020-6496>

Дата поступления рукописи в редакцию: 29/12/2025

Доработано: 16/02/2026

Принято: 16/02/2026

DOI: 10.52123/1994-2370-2026-1683

УДК 338.23

МРНТИ 06.56.31

Abstract. Corruption remains a systemic constraint on economic development, institutional performance, and investment activity in transition economies. For Kazakhstan, the implementation of OECD anti-corruption standards represents a critical step toward improving public governance, enhancing transparency, and reducing transaction costs. This research aims to assess the economic consequences of adopting OECD integrity frameworks and to identify institutional mechanisms through which anti-corruption reforms influence national economic indicators.

The research applies a mixed-method approach combining qualitative content analysis of OECD documents and national legislation with quantitative evaluation of macroeconomic data for 2010–2024. Comparative institutional analysis and econometric modelling were used to estimate the relationship between integrity indicators, regulatory quality, and investment dynamics.

The results show that stronger institutional integrity, improved regulatory quality, and digitalization of public services correlate with higher inflows of foreign direct investment, reduced transaction costs, and moderate acceleration of economic growth. Partial institutionalization of OECD recommendations is identified as a key barrier limiting the full economic impact of reforms.

The research develops an institutional-economic model explaining how OECD anti-corruption standards shape economic outcomes in Kazakhstan. It introduces a refined typology of economic effects arising from integrity reforms and provides evidence on the mechanisms linking institutional quality to investment and governance performance.

Key words: economy, anticorruption, institutionalism, efficiency, regulation, reforms, governance

Аңдатпа. Сыбайлас жемқорлық өтпелі экономика жағдайындағы елдерде экономикалық дамуға, институционалдық тиімділікке және инвестициялық белсенділікке жүйелі түрде кедергі келтіретін фактор болып қала береді. Қазақстан үшін ЭЫДҰ-ның сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы стандарттарын енгізу мемлекеттік басқаруды жетілдірудің, ашықтықты арттырудың және транзакциялық шығындарды төмендетудің маңызды қадамы болып табылады. Осы зерттеудің мақсаты: ЭЫДҰ-ның адалдыққа негізделген құралдарын енгізудің экономикалық

* Corresponding author: A. Maldynova, aizhanam@gmail.com

салдарын бағалау және сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы реформалардың ұлттық экономикалық көрсеткіштерге ықпал ету тетіктерін анықтау.

Зерттеуде ЭЫДҰ құжаттары мен ұлттық заңнаманы сапалық контент-талдаумен қатар 2010–2024 жылдар аралығындағы макроэкономикалық деректерді сандық бағалауды біріктіретін аралас әдіснамалық тәсіл қолданылды. Институционалдық салыстырмалы талдау және эконометриялық модельдеу әдістері институционалдық адалдық индикаторлары, реттеушілік сапа және инвестициялық динамика арасындағы өзара байланыстарды бағалау үшін пайдаланылды.

Зерттеу нәтижелері институционалдық адалдықтың нығаюы, реттеушілік сапаның жақсаруы және мемлекеттік қызметтерді цифрландыру тікелей шетелдік инвестициялар ағынының өсуімен, транзакциялық шығындардың азаюымен және экономикалық өсудің қалыпты жеделдеуімен статистикалық тұрғыдан мәнді байланыста екенін көрсетеді. Сонымен қатар, ЭЫДҰ ұсынымдарының толық институционалданбауы реформалардың экономикалық әсерін шектейтін негізгі кедергі ретінде анықталды.

Зерттеу барысында ЭЫДҰ-ның сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы стандарттарының Қазақстан экономикасына әсер ету механизмдерін түсіндіретін институционалдық-экономикалық модель әзірленді. Адалдық реформаларынан туындайтын экономикалық әсерлердің нақтыланған типологиясы ұсынылып, институттар сапасы, инвестициялық белсенділік және мемлекеттік басқару тиімділігі арасындағы байланыстарға эмпирикалық дәлелдер келтірілді.

Түйін сөздер: экономика, сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы іс-қимыл, институционалдық, тиімділік, реттеу, реформалар, басқару.

Аннотация. Коррупция продолжает оставаться системным ограничением экономического развития, институциональной эффективности и инвестиционной активности в странах с переходной экономикой. Для Казахстана внедрение антикоррупционных стандартов ОЭСР представляет собой важнейший этап совершенствования государственного управления, повышения прозрачности и снижения транзакционных издержек. Целью настоящего исследования является оценка экономических последствий имплементации инструментов добросовестности ОЭСР, а также выявление институциональных механизмов, посредством которых антикоррупционные реформы воздействуют на ключевые макроэкономические показатели страны.

В исследовании применяется смешанный методологический подход, сочетающий качественный контент-анализ документов ОЭСР и национального законодательства с количественной оценкой макроэкономических данных за период 2010-2024 гг. Используются методы сравнительного институционального анализа и эконометрического моделирования для оценки взаимосвязей между показателями институциональной добросовестности, регуляторного качества и инвестиционной динамики.

Результаты показывают, что укрепление институциональной добросовестности, повышение качества регулирования и цифровизация государственных услуг статистически значимо коррелируют с ростом притока прямых иностранных инвестиций, снижением транзакционных издержек и умеренным ускорением экономического роста. При этом частичная институционализация рекомендаций ОЭСР выявлена как ключевой барьер, ограничивающий полный экономический эффект проводимых реформ.

В рамках исследования разработана институционально-экономическая модель, объясняющая механизмы влияния антикоррупционных стандартов ОЭСР на экономические результаты Казахстана. Предложена уточнённая типология экономических эффектов реформ добросовестности и получены эмпирические доказательства связи между качеством институтов, инвестиционной активностью и эффективностью государственного управления.

Ключевые слова: экономика, антикоррупция, институциональность, эффективность, регуляторика, реформы, управление.

Introduction

Over the past decades, anti-corruption policy has become one of the central domains of inquiry within institutional economics and economic development studies. International scholarship has accumulated a substantial body of evidence on the impact of corruption on macroeconomic stability, investment behavior, and the performance of the public sector. A particular emphasis is placed on international integrity standards, including OECD recommendations, which are widely regarded as instruments for strengthening the transparency of economic institutions and reducing transaction costs. Nevertheless, for post-Soviet countries this area remains comparatively under-explored, especially with respect to the economic implications of adapting external anti-corruption standards to national institutional environments.

For Kazakhstan, the implementation of OECD principles and recommendations carries not only political but also direct economic significance. Persistent vulnerabilities of public institutions to corrupt practices continue to undermine the efficiency of public expenditure, distort competitive conditions, and increase the cost of doing business. Against the backdrop of ongoing public administration reforms, civil service modernization, and a strategic orientation toward alignment with international economic standards, it becomes essential to understand how OECD anti-corruption instruments influence the functioning of the national economy and what institutional transformations may be triggered by their adoption (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2023). The current state of research reveals notable gaps. In Kazakhstan's academic literature, comprehensive studies offering both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the economic effects associated with the implementation

of international anti-corruption practices remain scarce. The dynamics of institutional change arising from the adaptation of OECD recommendations within a hybrid model of public administration - combining elements of career-based and position-based civil service systems - have not been sufficiently examined (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020). Moreover, existing studies rarely address the relationship between reduced corruption risks and broader structural shifts in the economy, including increased market competitiveness, lower transaction costs, changes in investor behavior, and improvements in public sector efficiency (Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000).

Building on these gaps, the research problem is defined by the need for a scientifically grounded assessment of the economic consequences of implementing OECD anti-corruption practices in Kazakhstan. The absence of such an assessment constrains understanding of the extent to which these standards are capable of transforming institutional architecture and economic processes, as well as the degree to which their application aligns with the country's strategic development objectives. Addressing this problem requires the development of an analytical framework capable of explaining the mechanisms through which adopted anti-corruption practices influence economic indicators and institutional resilience (OECD, 2020; Kaufmann et al., 2010).

The aim of this research is to identify and analyze the economic implications of adapting OECD anti-corruption standards in Kazakhstan through the lens of an institutional approach. To achieve this aim, three core research objectives are formulated:

1. To conduct a theoretical review of the existing approaches used to assess the impact of anti-corruption policy on economic development;
2. To examine the degree of implementation of key OECD recommendations and the specific features of their adaptation in Kazakhstan;
3. To identify, classify, and explain the economic consequences arising from the introduction of anti-corruption practices within Kazakhstan's institutional system.

The scientific novelty of this research lies in the development of an institutional-economic model that elucidates the mechanisms through which OECD standards affect the national economy of Kazakhstan. The study proposes a refined typology of economic effects generated by the implementation of international anti-corruption practices and formulates conceptual provisions that make it possible to evaluate the influence of institutional reforms on public-sector efficiency, investment climate, and the competitiveness of the national economy. The novelty also stems from the contextualization of international methodological approaches to the specific features of Kazakhstan's hybrid public administration model, thereby enriching the existing scholarly discourse and addressing the identified research gaps.

Literature Review

Contemporary scholarly literature demonstrates a growing interest in the economic consequences of anti-corruption reforms, particularly in countries characterized by transitional institutional environments. Analytical reports and empirical studies produced by the OECD consistently highlight that corruption exerts a direct negative impact on macroeconomic performance, reduces the efficiency of public expenditure, and constrains private investment (OECD, 2024). The OECD Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024 provides evidence that corruption systematically undermines growth potential and distorts competitive markets, thereby making institutional reforms a prerequisite for sustainable development (OECD, 2024). The OECD Integrity Review of Kazakhstan further documents that Kazakhstan has undertaken extensive reforms in public administration; however, the economic effects of these measures remain insufficiently examined, despite progress in aligning the national regulatory framework with OECD standards (OECD, 2023).

The broader economic literature emphasizes that the institutional environment is a decisive determinant of public-sector performance. Bauhr and Charron (2023) demonstrate that reductions in corruption are associated with a reallocation of public expenditure toward capital investment, thereby fostering long-term economic growth. Similarly, improvements in governance quality have been shown to increase trust in public institutions and reduce transaction costs for businesses (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In a related strand of research, stronger regulatory oversight and transparency are found to reduce uncertainty for investors, particularly in sectors sensitive to regulatory barriers (North, 1990; Treisman, 2000). A rapidly expanding body of research focuses on the quantitative assessment of corruption-related economic losses. Empirical studies show that corruption in public procurement significantly reduces the efficiency of public contracting through

inflated costs and declining quality (Fazekas & Tóth, 2021). Firm-level analyses further demonstrate that corruption risks directly suppress private investment activity and hinder technological upgrading, thereby weakening productivity growth (Ferraz et al., 2012).

Methodological advances have also contributed substantially to the assessment of corruption-related economic effects. Recent studies employing data analytics and machine-learning techniques show that algorithmic models can effectively detect corruption patterns in public procurement and estimate associated economic losses with a high degree of accuracy (Fazekas et al., 2022). These approaches expand the empirical foundations of institutional research, particularly in environments where conventional statistical data are limited or incomplete.

Despite this progress, the applicability of OECD anti-corruption standards in countries with transitional economies, including Kazakhstan, remains insufficiently explored. Existing studies primarily describe institutional reforms but rarely assess their macroeconomic implications. In particular, there is a lack of empirical research evaluating how the implementation of OECD anti-corruption mechanisms affects economic growth, the structure of public expenditure, foreign direct investment inflows, and transaction costs. Moreover, the specific characteristics of Kazakhstan's hybrid civil service model—combining career-based and position-based elements—and its role in shaping anti-corruption effectiveness remain largely unexamined (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020). Several research gaps thus become apparent. First, empirical studies linking the adoption of OECD standards to Kazakhstan's economic indicators remain scarce, despite recent institutional reforms. Second, the limited presence of Kazakhstan-focused research in international journals results in a lack of comparable long-term datasets capturing institutional change dynamics. Third, the role of human resource management mechanisms within the civil service in shaping anti-corruption outcomes has not been sufficiently theorized, notwithstanding its emphasis in OECD policy reports. Finally, advanced quantitative methods, including data-driven and machine-learning-based approaches, are still rarely applied to assess the economic effects of anti-corruption reforms in Central Asia, limiting the robustness of existing evidence.

Collectively, these gaps underscore the need for a comprehensive institutional and economic analysis of the applicability and effectiveness of OECD anti-corruption standards in Kazakhstan. Such an analysis is essential for determining the extent to which integrity reforms contribute to economic resilience, improved public governance, and an enhanced investment climate. This rationale forms the conceptual foundation of the present study.

Materials and Methods

The study employs a mixed-methods research design that integrates qualitative, quantitative, and comparative analytical components. The qualitative dimension consists of a systematic content analysis of key OECD documents and national regulatory acts, including the OECD Anti-Corruption and Integrity Framework and the OECD Public Governance Reviews. The quantitative component draws on macroeconomic indicators of Kazakhstan—GDP growth, foreign direct investment inflows, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), government effectiveness, and regulatory quality—sourced from the World Bank, Transparency International, and national statistical authorities such as the Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Bureau of National Statistics. The comparative institutional analysis examines benchmark countries that demonstrate a high level of conformity with OECD integrity standards, enabling an assessment of Kazakhstan's relative institutional position and reform trajectory.

The rationale for this methodological configuration lies in the multi-layered nature of OECD anti-corruption standards, which function simultaneously as legal requirements, institutional norms, and economic incentives (OECD, 2017, 2024). Accordingly, the dataset encompasses the full corpus of OECD anti-corruption and public governance documents, Kazakhstan's national legislation on integrity and civil service reform, as well as relevant macroeconomic and governance indicators drawn from international databases. This combination provides a robust empirical basis for identifying causal mechanisms linking the adoption of OECD standards to institutional and economic outcomes.

To identify the economic consequences of implementing OECD standards, the study applies a quantitative analysis of the dynamics of key macroeconomic and governance indicators, including gross domestic product (GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), government effectiveness, and regulatory quality (Transparency International, 2024; World Bank, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024). The observation period spans 2010–2024, enabling a before-and-

after comparison relative to the active phase of OECD engagement with Kazakhstan, particularly following the OECD *Public Governance Reviews: Kazakhstan* published in 2014, 2017, and 2020 (OECD, 2014, 2017, 2020). This longitudinal approach allows for the identification of structural shifts associated with institutional reforms initiated under OECD guidance (Table 1).

Table 1. CPI, GDP, and FDI: Key Indicators for Kazakhstan

Year	CPI (Transparency International)	Real GDP, billion USD	FDI inflow, % of GDP
2010	29/100	194,6	6.5%
2015	28/100	171,8	5.2%
2020	38/100	179,3	4.8%
2022	34/100	203,6	3.9%
2024	36/100	218,9	4.5%

Note: compiled by the authors based on sources Transparency International (2024); World Bank (2024), UNCTAD (2024)

The qualitative component of the study involves a structured content analysis of core OECD integrity and anti-corruption documents, including the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (2017) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Reports. These materials are systematically compared with the principal national strategic frameworks of Kazakhstan, such as the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2015–2025, the Digital Government Programme, and the ongoing public service reforms associated with the transition toward a hybrid career-position model. This methodological configuration enables the simultaneous assessment of institutional alignment and economic implications, offering an integrated perspective on the extent to which OECD standards are embedded in Kazakhstan’s governance architecture (Table 2).

Table 2. Alignment of key OECD integrity documents with Kazakhstan’s national anti-corruption strategies and assessment of convergence

№	Key OECD Document	Core Requirements / Recommendations	Corresponding National Strategies of Kazakhstan	Commentary and Assessment of Alignment
1	OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (2017)	Corruption management, transparency, accountability	Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2015–2025	Alignment is evident at the level of strategic objectives, yet enforcement, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms require substantial strengthening.
2	OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Reports	Prevention of bribery of foreign public officials, monitoring and enforcement	Anti-Corruption Strategy, civil service reform	Partial alignment; the ongoing transition toward a hybrid career-position civil service model creates institutional conditions conducive to more effective implementation.
3	OECD Guidelines on Digital Government (2020)	Digitalization of processes, enhanced transparency of public services	Digital Government Programme	High degree of integration of digital tools; further development of comprehensive e-governance mechanisms remains promising.
4	OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement (2015)	Transparency, competitiveness, oversight in public procurement	National public procurement development strategy	Implementation has begun; however, anti-corruption oversight and audit capacity remain insufficient.
5	OECD Principles of Public Administration (2017)	Effective public sector management, professionalism, merit-based service	Civil service reform; transition to a hybrid career-position model	Active implementation enhances institutional resilience and administrative capacity.

6	OECD Risk Management Guidance (2019)	Identification, assessment, and mitigation of corruption risks	Internal control mechanisms within public bodies; development of compliance systems	Implementation is fragmented; systemic institutionalization and harmonization are still required.
7	OECD Public Sector Integrity Toolkit (2018)	Promotion of ethical standards and integrity culture	Anti-Corruption Strategy, public servant training programmes	Training initiatives are partially implemented, but require expansion and more consistent integration.
8	OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy (2012)	Improved quality of regulation, reduction of unnecessary administrative barriers	Programmes to enhance regulatory quality	Initial progress is observable, yet the quality, transparency, and predictability of regulations require further improvement.
9	OECD Framework on the Governance of Infrastructure (2019)	Transparent and efficient management of infrastructure projects	State investment projects; infrastructure development initiatives	Weak coordination and oversight increase vulnerability to corruption risks, highlighting governance gaps.
10	OECD Guidelines on Whistleblower Protection (2016)	Mechanisms for protecting whistleblowers and encouraging reporting of misconduct	Anti-Corruption Strategy 2015–2025, relevant legislation	Protection remains insufficient; institutional and legal mechanisms for supporting whistleblowers require significant enhancement.

Note: compiled by the authors based on sources (OECD, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2023).


The study employs a multi-stage analytical design integrating institutional, econometric, and comparative methods. First, a systematic mapping of OECD integrity and anti-corruption requirements is conducted against the current configuration of Kazakhstan’s national anti-corruption infrastructure. This procedure enables the identification of institutional congruence, implementation gaps, and areas of partial alignment between international standards and domestic governance arrangements (OECD, 2017, 2024).

Second, an econometric model based on panel data from selected economies within the Eurasian Economic Union, OECD member states, and Central Asia is constructed to estimate the effects of key anti-corruption policy instruments on capital inflows and regulatory effectiveness. This modelling framework makes it possible to isolate the contribution of integrity reforms to macroeconomic performance while controlling for cross-country structural, institutional, and governance heterogeneity (World Bank, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024).

Third, the empirical and qualitative findings are interpreted through the conceptual framework of institutional effectiveness developed by Douglass C. North, which emphasizes the role of formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement mechanisms in shaping economic performance (North, 1990). This framework is complemented by contemporary scholarship on the political economy and measurement of anti-corruption reforms, including studies on systemic corruption control and data-driven integrity analysis (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020; Fazekas & Tóth, 2021). In addition, analytical insights from the OECD *Integrity Review* and *Public Governance Review* series are incorporated to contextualize Kazakhstan’s reform trajectory within international comparative practice (OECD, 2020, 2023).

The overall research design is summarized in the flowchart presented in Figure 1, which outlines the analytical sequence from problem formulation and data collection to econometric estimation, institutional comparison, and synthesis of findings.

Figure 1. Research Sequence



Note: compiled by the authors

The proposed methodological configuration makes it possible to assess not only Kazakhstan’s formal alignment with OECD standards but also the economic effects generated by the implementation of anti-corruption practices, the institutional barriers that persist, and the types of reforms that demonstrate the strongest impact on improving investment attractiveness and the quality of public governance.

Results

The analysis shows that the influence of OECD anti-corruption practices on Kazakhstan’s economic parameters unfolds across three interrelated dimensions: institutional alignment, regulatory efficiency, and investment dynamics. These findings were derived from a combined assessment of OECD documents, national legislation, and an econometric evaluation of the relationship between institutional quality and macroeconomic indicators over the period 2010–2024. Within the study, key variables were identified and tested, capturing institutional quality, corruption-risk levels, and the dynamics of macroeconomic performance. Their systematic operationalization is presented in Table 3. This approach ensures comparability of indicators and supports the reproducibility of subsequent modelling.

Table 3. Operationalization of key research variables

Variable	Description	Indicators	Data Sources
Level of Corruption Risks	Degree of both perceived and actual institutional vulnerability	CPI, Public Integrity Indicators	Transparency International; OECD
Regulatory Quality	Effectiveness and predictability of government rules and regulatory frameworks	Regulatory Quality Index; Government Effectiveness	World Bank (WGI)
OECD Practices	Extent of implementation of integrity and good-governance standards	Procurement transparency; risk-based oversight; open-data practices	OECD Integrity Reviews
Foreign Direct Investment	Investor confidence and openness of the national economy	FDI (% of GDP)	UNCTAD; Bureau of National Statistics (Kazakhstan)
Economic Activity	Overall dynamics of economic growth	GDP; labor productivity	World Bank; Bureau of National Statistics (Kazakhstan)

Note: compiled by the authors

The operationalization demonstrates that each institutional variable exerts direct influence on economic dynamics, thereby confirming the relevance of applying an institutional-economic approach to the evaluation of anti-corruption policies.

Normative comparison reveals that Kazakhstan exhibits a heterogeneous level of compliance with the key areas of OECD anti-corruption policy. The highest alignment is observed in the

digitalization of public services and transparency of public procurement, whereas the independence of oversight bodies and the development of risk-based approaches remain limited (Table 4).

Table 4. Degree of Kazakhstan’s Compliance with OECD Recommendations

Recommendation Area	Status	Commentary	Source
Public Procurement Transparency	High	Well-developed e-procurement ecosystem	OECD, PPRC
Income Declaration	Moderate	Reform in transitional phase	Ministry of Finance of RK
Independence of Oversight Bodies	Low	Systemic institutional dependence	OECD Public Governance Review
Corruption Risk Management	Moderate	Methodology partially implemented	Agency of RK
Digital Public Services	High	High scores in GovTech Index	World Bank

Note: compiled by the authors

The comparison indicates that normative implementation remains only partially institutionalized, thereby limiting the economic impact of OECD standards. For quantitative assessment, panel data from Kazakhstan, Poland, Georgia, Estonia, and Latvia spanning 2010–2023 were utilized, enabling the construction of a fixed-effects model to test hypotheses regarding the influence of institutional quality on economic indicators (Table 5).

Table 5. Econometric results on the impact of institutional variables on fdi and productivity

Indicator	β	p-value	Interpretation
CPI (+1) → FDI (% of GDP)	+0.045	0.012	Improvement in CPI increases FDI inflows by 4.5%
Regulatory Quality → FDI	+0.031	0.041	Regulatory predictability enhances investor confidence
Government Effectiveness → Productivity	+0.067	0.005	More effective governance accelerates economic growth
Digital Government Services → Transaction Costs	-0.22	0.018	Reduction of transaction costs in public procurement

Note: compiled by the authors

The results confirm the central hypothesis of the study: the economic impact of OECD anti-corruption practices is realized through the enhancement of institutional quality and the reduction of transaction costs.

The institutional environment analysis identified several barriers limiting the scalability of anti-corruption practices, as well as incentives that create potential for achieving economic effects (Table 6).

Table 6. Institutional barriers and Incentives for the implementation of OECD practices

Category	Elements	Impact
Barriers	Limited independence of oversight	Reduces institutional reliability
	Insufficient risk-based analytics	Limits reform effectiveness
	Uneven transparency across sectors	Diminishes macroeconomic impact
Incentives	Digitalization	Reduces costs and risks
	Open data and e-procurement	Enhances investor confidence
	Development of civil service skills	Strengthens reform sustainability

Note: compiled by the authors

The presence of systemic incentives enables a structural effect; however, existing barriers slow the pace of institutional change. The final model demonstrates that the economic impact of OECD anti-corruption practices manifests through the combination of three key mechanisms: reduction of corruption risks, improvement of institutional quality, and the creation of a predictable regulatory environment.

Table 7 presents a consolidated model of the influence of OECD anti-corruption policy on the economy of Kazakhstan, highlighting the components, mechanisms, and resulting economic outcomes. This framework underscores the importance of establishing clear and predictable rules, automating governance processes to limit corruption opportunities, enhancing transparency and accountability to attract foreign direct investment and stimulate business activity, and ensuring policy consistency to foster a competitive market environment.

Table 7. Integrated model of the impact of OECD anti-corruption policy on Kazakhstan’s economy

Component	Mechanism	Economic Outcome
OECD Anti-Corruption Standards	Establishment of predictable rules	Increased trust, reduced transaction costs
Digitalization of Public Administration	Process automation	Reduction of opportunities for corruption
Improvement of Institutional Quality	Transparency and accountability	Growth in FDI and business activity
Regulatory Modernization	Policy consistency	Development of a competitive environment

Note: compiled by the authors

The findings confirm that the implementation of OECD anti-corruption standards in Kazakhstan holds significant economic potential. However, the realized effect depends less on formal compliance with recommendations and more on the depth of institutionalization of reforms. The econometric analysis reveals a direct positive relationship between the reduction of corruption risks and the growth of investment activity, while the institutional analysis highlights critical bottlenecks—primarily the limited independence of supervisory bodies and insufficient development of risk analytics. Collectively, these results emphasize the need to shift from a normative-declarative model toward a risk-oriented, institutionally embedded framework of anti-corruption policy that ensures sustainable socio-economic outcomes.

Discussion

The results indicate that the implementation of OECD anti-corruption standards in Kazakhstan has generated measurable economic effects, reflected in improvements in institutional quality indicators, increased inflows of foreign direct investment, and a moderate acceleration of economic growth. The interpretation of these findings demonstrates strong consistency with established conclusions in the international literature on corruption and economic performance. In particular, the reduction of institutional risks – captured through improvements in the Corruption Perceptions Index and regulatory quality indicators – corresponds to the theoretical framework proposed by Mauro (1995), who identifies corruption as a critical determinant of reduced investment activity, inefficient resource allocation, and lower long-term growth. Similarly, Treisman (2000) demonstrates that institutional transparency and predictability are systematically associated with more sustainable economic outcomes. This relationship is corroborated by Kazakhstan’s experience, where the period following the intensification of OECD-supported reforms coincides with improvements in Worldwide Governance Indicators and increased investor confidence (Kaufmann et al., 2010).

Comparative analysis with international monitoring reports further reinforces these conclusions. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index reports consistently emphasize that the sustained implementation of good governance standards, public accountability mechanisms, and civil service reforms contributes to a more favorable business environment and lower transaction costs (Transparency International, 2024). Parallel findings are reported in the OECD *Public Governance Review: Kazakhstan*, which underscores that the economic returns of anti-corruption reforms emerge gradually and are most pronounced in countries undertaking comprehensive reforms in public administration and human resource management systems (OECD, 2014, 2017, 2020).

The study’s findings also align with a broader body of research in institutional economics emphasizing the central role of governance quality in shaping economic outcomes. World Bank analytical work highlights that improvements in regulatory quality and government effectiveness are

associated with higher inflows of foreign direct investment and accelerated structural modernization in economies with transitional governance models (World Bank, 2023). Kazakhstan exhibits a similar trajectory, as increases in government effectiveness between 2015 and 2023 correlate with growing investment volumes and improved positions in international investment climate rankings (World Bank, 2024).

An important dimension of the discussion concerns cross-country variation in reform outcomes. Research by Mungiu-Pippidi (2020) emphasizes that the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs depends heavily on governance configurations. Hybrid models of public administration—combining career-based and position-based civil service systems, as observed in Kazakhstan—tend to exhibit longer time lags between reform implementation and observable economic effects. The results of this study support this argument: although the initial adaptation of OECD standards began in the mid-2010s, statistically significant economic effects became evident primarily after 2018–2020. Finally, the findings are consistent with research highlighting regulatory quality and administrative transparency as key drivers of economic growth. Analyses based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators demonstrate that improvements in transparency, regulatory predictability, and digitalization of public services substantially reduce business costs and investment risks (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Since 2019, Kazakhstan has accelerated the development of GovTech and e-government initiatives, a trend documented in OECD and World Bank reports, thereby reinforcing the institutional impact of anti-corruption reforms on economic performance (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2024).

Thus, the interpretation of the study results confirms that the implementation of OECD anti-corruption standards exerts a multifaceted impact on Kazakhstan's economic development. The application of quantitative methods revealed a positive trajectory in key macroeconomic and institutional indicators, with observed changes aligning closely with global theoretical models and empirical findings in the international literature. A novel contribution of this research is the empirical validation that institutional reforms in Kazakhstan have a statistically significant effect on the dynamics of foreign direct investment inflows and improvements in governance quality factors traditionally recognized as critical drivers of long-term economic growth.

The presented analysis enables several important conclusions and highlights directions for future work in the field of anti-corruption policy and economic development in Kazakhstan.

The originality of this study lies in its comprehensive institutional-economic analysis of the implementation of OECD anti-corruption standards within the specific context of Kazakhstan, considering contemporary public administration reforms and digitalization efforts. For the first time, an integrated comparison of international recommendations and national strategies is combined with a quantitative assessment of their impact on economic indicators such as GDP, FDI inflows, corruption perception indices, and government effectiveness metrics. This approach allowed the identification of concrete mechanisms through which anti-corruption measures contribute to the creation of a favorable investment climate and sustainable economic growth.

The theoretical contribution of this research expands the understanding of the relationship between anti-corruption policy and economic development amid institutional transformation in developing countries. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adapting international standards to local specificities and integrating digital reforms into public administration practices. This approach fosters a rethinking of the role of institutional factors in ensuring the resilience and efficiency of economic processes.

The practical significance of the work lies in the applicability of the developed analytical framework and evaluation methodology for assessing the impact of anti-corruption standards, which can inform the refinement of public policy. The study's results may serve as a foundation for adjusting anti-corruption programs, enhancing the transparency and efficiency of state institutions, and establishing a sustainable governance system that accounts for the hybrid model of the civil service.

Nevertheless, this study has certain limitations. The analysis is based on data from the period 2010–2024, which does not fully capture the long-term effects of anti-corruption measures. The quantitative methods rely on aggregated macroeconomic indicators, limiting the ability to identify regional and sectoral disparities. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis is primarily grounded in official documents and strategies, which may not fully reflect informal practices and local perceptions.

For future research, it is recommended to expand the scope of the study by incorporating regional case studies and sector-specific analyses, as well as employing mixed methods that utilize empirical data from surveys and interviews. Particular attention should be given to investigating the

impact of digitalization and innovative technologies on anti-corruption processes and public administration, as this represents a promising avenue for fostering sustainable economic development in Kazakhstan.

References

- Bauhr, M., Charron, N. (2023). *The quality of government and corruption: Theory and evidence*. University of Gothenburg, QoG Institute.
URL: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> (accessed: 12 November 2025).
- Fazekas, M., Toth, B. (2021). From corruption to state capture: A new analytical framework with empirical applications from Hungary. *Political Research Exchange*, 3(1), 1–28.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2021.1949804> (accessed: 18 November 2025).
- Fazekas, M., Sberna, S., Vannucci, A. (2022). Big data analysis to uncover corruption patterns in public procurement. *Government Information Quarterly*, 39(2), 101632.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2021.101632> (accessed: 21 November 2025).
- Ferraz, C., Finan, F., Moreira, D. B. (2012). Corrupting learning: Evidence from missing federal education funds in Brazil. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(9–10), 712–726.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003> (accessed: 25 November 2025).
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430*. World Bank.
URL: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/630421468336563314> (accessed: 27 November 2025).
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 681–712.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696> (accessed: 01 December 2025).
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2020). *Europe's corruption challenge: Accountability, governance, and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108769011> (accessed: 03 December 2025).
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2020). The rise and fall of good governance promotion. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(1), 88–102.
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0007> (accessed: 05 December 2025).
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678> (accessed: 08 December 2025).
- OECD. (2012). *Recommendation of the Council on regulatory policy and governance*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2012-recommendation.htm> (accessed: 10 December 2025).
- OECD. (2014). *Public governance review: Kazakhstan*. OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264219227-en> (accessed: 12 December 2025).
- OECD. (2015). *Recommendation of the Council on public procurement*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/recommendation.htm> (accessed: 15 December 2025).
- OECD. (2016). *Committing to effective whistleblower protection*. OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252637-en> (accessed: 17 December 2025).
- OECD. (2017). *Recommendation of the Council on public integrity*. OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264278323-en> (accessed: 19 December 2025).
- OECD. (2018). *Public sector integrity: A toolkit*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/public-sector-integrity-toolkit.htm> (accessed: 22 December 2025).
- OECD. (2019). *OECD framework on the governance of infrastructure*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/infrastructure-framework.htm> (accessed: 23 December 2025).
- OECD. (2020). *Public governance review: Kazakhstan*. OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/3c5a9b7f-en> (accessed: 24 December 2025).
- OECD. (2023). *OECD anti-bribery convention: Phase 4 report on Kazakhstan*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/kazakhstan-phase-4-report.htm> (accessed: 26 December 2025).
- OECD. (2023). *OECD integrity review of Kazakhstan*. OECD Publishing.
URL: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/integrity/integrity-review-kazakhstan.htm> (accessed: 29 December 2025).
- OECD. (2024). *OECD anti-corruption and integrity outlook 2024*. OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/bd8d9a25-en> (accessed: 30 December 2025).
- Transparency International. (2024). *Corruption perceptions index 2024*.
URL: <https://www.transparency.org> (accessed: 28 November 2025).
- Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. *Journal of Public Economics*, 76(3), 399–457.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(99\)00092-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4) (accessed: 20 November 2025).
- UNCTAD. (2024). *World investment report 2024: Investment facilitation and digital government*. United Nations.
URL: <https://unctad.org> (accessed: 14 November 2025).

World Bank. (2023). *Enhancing government effectiveness and transparency: The fight against corruption*. World Bank.
URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/publication/enhancing-government-effectiveness-and-transparency> (accessed: 19 November 2025).

ЭЫДҰ СЫБАЙЛАС ЖЕМҚОРЛЫҚҚА ҚАРСЫ ҚҰРАЛДАРЫНЫҢ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ ТАЛДАУЫ ЖӘНЕ ОЛАРДЫҢ ҚАЗАҚСТАНДАҒЫ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК СЕКТОРДЫҢ ЖҰМЫСЫНА ЖӘНЕ РЕТТЕУШІЛІК САПАСЫНА ӘСЕРІ

Айжана МАЛДЫНОВА*, PhD, постдокторантура зерттеушісі, Абай атындағы Қазақ ұлттық педагогикалық университеті, Алматы, Қазақстан, aizhanam@gmail.com, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6546-378>

Назгүл АЙДАРҒАЛИЕВА, PhD, доцент, Л.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті, Қаржы кафедрасы, Астана, Қазақстан, aidargaliyeva@enu.kz, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7958-6854>

Валентина ГЕРАСИМЕНКО, экономика ғылымдарының докторы, профессор, Ломоносов атындағы Мәскеу мемлекеттік университеті, Маркетинг кафедрасы, Мәскеу, Ресей Федерациясы, vv_gerasimenko@mail.ru, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9020-6496>

ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ ИНСТРУМЕНТОВ БОРЬБЫ С КОРРУПЦИЕЙ ОЭСР И ИХ ВЛИЯНИЕ НА ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТЬ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО СЕКТОРА И КАЧЕСТВО РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ

Айжана МАЛДЫНОВА*, PhD, постдокторант, Казахский национальный педагогический университет им. Абая, Алматы, Казахстан, aizhanam@gmail.com, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6546-378>;

Назгуль АЙДАРҒАЛИЕВА, PhD, ассоц. профессор, Евразийский национальный университет им. Л.Н. Гумилёва, кафедра финансов, Астана, Казахстан, aidargaliyeva@enu.kz, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7958-6854>

Валентина ГЕРАСИМЕНКО, доктор экономических наук, профессор, Московский государственный университет им. Ломоносова, факультет маркетинга, Москва, Российская Федерация, vv_gerasimenko@mail.ru, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9020-6496>.