
COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION DURING THE COLD WAR (1947-1991)

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Abstract. This article examines the cooperation between Turkey and the European Union during the Cold War (1947-1991), focusing on the key aspects of their political, economic, and military ties. In the context of the rivalry between two global systems, Turkey sought to enhance its security and international status by actively pursuing closer relations with the West. The analysis highlights significant agreements, such as the Mutual Assistance Agreement (1952) and Turkey's subsequent entry into NATO, which marked a crucial step towards integration into Western structures. The article investigates the factors that facilitated this cooperation, including Turkey's fear of Soviet expansion, the geopolitical importance of the region, and the West's desire to strengthen its position in the Middle East. Special attention is given to the role of the European Union, which, despite its initial economic focus, became a key player in shaping Turkey's military and political strategy. The consequences of this cooperation for Turkey's domestic politics and social structure are also explored. A comparative analysis of different periods during the Cold War allows for the identification of changes in the approaches of both parties toward cooperation and their impact on the current state of relations. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the interaction between Turkey and the EU during this period laid an important foundation for the development of their relationship, which remains relevant in the context of contemporary challenges. The article draws on a wide range of materials and publications, allowing for nuanced conclusions about the complexity and multi-layered nature of this cooperation.

Keywords: Turkey, EU, cold war, westernization, the Ankara Agreement, Cyprus crisis.

Аңдатпа. Мақала қырғи-қабақ соғыс кезіндегі Түркия мен Еуропалық Одақтың ынтымақтастығын зерттеуге арналған (1947-1991), осы субъектілер арасындағы саяси, экономикалық және әскери байланыстардың негізгі аспектілерін қарастырады. Екі әлемдік жүйенің қарама-қайшылығы жағдайында Түркия өзінің қауіпсіздігі мен халықаралық мәртебесін нығайтуға ұмтылып, Батыспен жақындасуға белсене кірісті. Өзара көмек туралы келісім (1952) және кейіннен Түркияның НАТО-ға кіруі сияқты маңызды келісімдерге қол қоюды талдауға баса назар аударылады, бұл Батыс құрылымдарына интеграциялануда маңызды қадам болды. Мақалада осы ынтымақтастыққа ықпал еткен себептер, соның ішінде Түркияның кеңестік ықпалдың кеңеюінен қорқуы, аймақтың геосаяси маңыздылығы және Батыстың Таяу Шығыстағы позициясын нығайтуға деген ұмтылысы қарастырылады. Еуропалық Одақтың рөліне ерекше назар аударылады, ол өзінің алғашқы экономикалық бағытына қарамастан Түркияның әскери және саяси стратегиясын қалыптастырудағы негізгі ойыншыға айналды. Түркияның ішкі саясаты мен оның әлеуметтік құрылымы үшін осы ынтымақтастықтың салдары да қарастырылуда. Қырғи-қабақ соғыстың әртүрлі кезеңдерін салыстырмалы талдау екі жақтың ынтымақтастыққа деген көзқарастарындағы өзгерістерді, сондай-ақ олардың қарым-қатынастың қазіргі жағдайына әсерін анықтауға мүмкіндік береді. Қорытындылай келе, осы кезеңдегі Түркия мен ЕО арасындағы өзара іс-қимыл олардың қарым-қатынастарын одан әрі дамыту үшін маңызды негіз болды, бұл қазіргі заманғы сын-қатерлер аясында да өзекті болып табылады. Мақала осы ынтымақтастықтың күрделілігі мен көпбағыттылығы туралы қорытынды жасауға мүмкіндік беретін материалдар мен жарияланымдардың кең спектріне негізделген.

Түйін сөздер: Түркия, ЕО, қырғи-қабақ соғыс, батыстандыру, Анкара келісімі, Кипр дағдарысы.

Аннотация. Статья посвящена исследованию сотрудничества Турции и Европейского Союза в период Холодной войны (1947-1991 гг.), рассматривая ключевые аспекты политических, экономических и военных связей между этими субъектами. В условиях противостояния двух мировых систем Турция, стремясь укрепить свою безопасность и международный статус, активно искала сближения с Западом. Основное внимание уделяется анализу подписания важных соглашений, таких как Соглашение о взаимной помощи (1952) и последующее

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вступление Турции в НАТО, что стало значимым шагом к интеграции в западные структуры. В статье исследуются причины, способствовавшие этому сотрудничеству, включая страх Турции перед экспансией советского влияния, геополитическую значимость региона и стремление Запада укрепить свои позиции на Ближнем Востоке. Особое внимание уделяется роли Европейского Союза, который, несмотря на первоначальную экономическую направленность, стал ключевым игроком в формировании военной и политической стратегии Турции. Рассматриваются также последствия этого сотрудничества для внутренней политики Турции и её социальной структуры. Сравнительный анализ различных периодов Холодной войны позволяет выявить изменения в подходах обеих сторон к сотрудничеству, а также их влияние на современное состояние отношений. В заключение подчеркивается, что взаимодействие Турции и ЕС в этот период стало важной основой для дальнейшего развития их отношений, что имеет актуальное значение и в контексте современных вызовов. Статья опирается на обширный спектр материалов и публикаций, что позволяет сделать выводы о комплексности и многослойности данного сотрудничества.

Ключевые слова: Турция, ЕС, холодная война, вестернизация, Анкарское соглашение, кипрский кризис.

Introduction

Since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state has managed to maintain the basic principles of creating and reproducing a new Turkish identity - secularism and Kemalism. However, despite Turkey's commitment to these principles, the European Community is in no hurry to accept Turkey as a member. The issue of Turkey's accession to the EU is the subject of heated debate in modern Europe. One part of the European bureaucracy and civil society, if not welcoming, then at least does not exclude such a possibility, while the other is categorically negative. The entire history of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU clearly demonstrates that the impasse they have now reached is explained not so much by Realpolitik considerations as by sociocultural reasons. In other words, the root of the problem lies more in the plane of identity than in the plane of interests. The beginning of the Cold War and the split of the European continent in the context of geopolitical confrontation between the two blocs brought security issues to the forefront, which for many years provided Turkey with one of the key roles in this system. Without having a developed economy, Turkey, thanks to the advantages of its geographical location, managed to become an important and in many ways indispensable coalition partner for the United States and Western Europe in solving the problem of "containing Soviet expansion." By joining Western military and economic unions and associations (in 1947 - in the IMF and World Bank, in 1952 - in NATO) and taking part in armed conflicts, Turkey sought to ensure its own security, as well as access to financial, economic and technological centers.

After World War II, the rapid practical Westernization of Turkey began. First of all, the country was included in the scope of the Marshall Plan. In 1948, Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was later transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 1949 she became a member of the Council of Europe, called upon to be the guardian of European values and principles. The fact of acceptance implied that the Republic of Turkey met the basic conditions for accession: it was a European country and committed to respect for human rights, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law. The Turkish Constitution contained the necessary guarantees for the above. In 1951, it joined the GATT, and in 1952, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. That same year, Turkey joined NATO and became the cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic security system on its southern flank.

Late 1950s was marked by the loss of the dominant position of the United States in the system of relations with Turkey, losing it to Western European countries. From the very beginning, Ankara has demonstrated a clear interest in the European integration process. This was fully combined with the Kemalist policy of Europeanization of the country. In addition, the internal situation in Turkey was marked by worsening economic difficulties: a general increase in the budget deficit, a negative balance in foreign trade, strong inflation and a balance of payments crisis. Thus, it was economic motivation that became the incentive for Ankara to try to transfer cooperation with the the European Economic Community (EEC) to the level of integration rapprochement[1]. As for the Community, its interest in cooperation with Turkey can be explained by Ankara's role as a "barrier" from

the USSR and a “bridge” to the Near and Middle East. Consequently, the current foreign policy situation for the Turkish republic during the beginning of the Cold War pushed the Turkish leaders to move closer towards the European alliance, as a result of which, the European direction in foreign policy today is an integral part of Turkish foreign policy. The study of the dynamics of the development of the European direction is the purpose of this scientific research.

Materials and research Methods

The methodology of this scientific work is based on a combination of several approaches that allow for a deep and multifaceted study of cooperation between Turkey and the European Union during the Cold War (1947-1991). First of all, the historical method is used, starting with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and ending with the events of the late 1990s. This method allows us to identify the evolution of key principles of Turkish identity, such as secularism and Kemalism, as well as to trace the evolution of relations between these two subjects in the context of key historical events and changes in the international situation. The historical method helps to establish a link between internal political changes and international dynamics, which is important for understanding Turkey's motivation towards the European Union.

The analysis of archival documents and publications reveals the relationship between internal and external political processes. Political and Economic Analysis Political and economic analysis is used to study the economic factors that prompted Turkey to integrate with the European Economic Community (EEC). The article examines such aspects as Turkey's participation in the Marshall Plan, its membership in various international organizations and the economic difficulties that the country faced. This method allows us to trace how economic motivation and the need to stabilize the domestic economy have become important factors in Turkey's quest for European integration. Finally, the application of the theory of international relations, including realism, liberalism and constructivism, allows for a deeper understanding of the motivations and strategies of both Turkey and the European

Union. The methodology includes the application of theories of international relations, such as realism and constructivism, to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy. A realistic approach helps to understand how strategic interests and security considerations determined Turkey's role as a “barrier” from the USSR and a “bridge” to the Middle East. Constructivism, in turn, allows us to explore how identities and cultural aspects shape the perception of Turkey as a potential EU member. Together, the use of these methods provides a deep understanding of the dynamics and complexities of relations between Turkey and the European Union in the context of the Cold War, which makes this analysis multilevel and relevant.

Results and discussion

1. First steps to negotiations

Greece's request for admission to the Common Market on June 8, 1959 accelerated the process of Turkey's rapprochement with the EEC, which began with the order of the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu on the preparation of an application for accession. The proposal was adopted at a meeting of the Turkish Council of Ministers on July 30, 1959, and on July 31, Ankara officially submitted an application to sign an Association Agreement, which was supported by the Federal Republic of Germany. The EEC accepted the Turkish request, understanding that the level of economic development of the country (underdeveloped infrastructure, low industrial profitability, balance of payments deficit, high unemployment, rapid population growth) excluded its integration with the Common Market in the near future. Turkey's request was considered at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EEC in Brussels on September 11, 1959. The Community countries were the main suppliers of imported goods to Turkey (about 30%), and the implementation of the association agreement within the framework of the Common Market made it possible to expand the export of Turkish goods to Europe and thereby attract foreign currency, which the country badly needed[2]. Turkey was attracted the inclusion of agriculture in the scope of priorities of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, since at that time it was the largest sector of its economy. But first of all, in the perspective of a possible association with the Common

Market, the Turkish authorities hoped to achieve financing for the country's economic development. From the very beginning, Turkey asked the EEC to provide it with economic and financial assistance to improve infrastructure and intensify industrial development.

The community, in turn, was economically interested in Turkey as a source of strategic goods: chrome and copper ore, manganese; as well as in the import of Turkish tobacco, cotton, and other agricultural products[3]. Western European countries actively attracted Turkish labor. In September 1959, the European Commission began the first stage of preparatory negotiations. They began on September 28, 1959 and continued until December 2. After the completion of the negotiations, Türkiye expressed its desire for the gradual formation of a customs union with the Common Market. Negotiations, resumed on May 11, 1960, were interrupted due to the emergence of disagreements within the EEC. The European Commission had a negative attitude towards the final version of the association agreement, since in it the Community assumed significant economic obligations. Some EEC members, notably France, denied Turkey's cultural identity with Europe[4]. But most Common Market members feared the political consequences of a complete withdrawal. The military coup of May 27, 1960, which was accompanied by a sharp restriction of democratic rights and freedoms and large-scale repressions, gave the EEC an acceptable reason to terminate negotiations with Turkey. While the latter has not yet decided on the essence of the agreement: whether it will be a simple trade agreement, as the European Commission wanted, or an association agreement identical to the one signed with Greece. Thus, the lack of certainty regarding the essence of the agreement and the execution of Premier Menderes along with two of his cabinet ministers led to the freezing of negotiations in September 1960. On 24 August 1961, the Turkish military government addressed a memorandum to the six members of the Community in which it protested the signing of the Association Agreement with Greece, which occurred while negotiations with Turkey were blocked, and insisted on the conclusion of a similar agreement including itself a customs union. In November 1961, a

civilian government led by İnönü came to power as a result of democratic elections, and on March 5, 1962, it published a memorandum formulating the same demands that the military had put forward.

2. The Ankara Agreement

Turkey's intention to strengthen ties with the Common Market fit into the economic development strategy developed in 1962 for the first five-year plan, approved by the government in 1963. Germany demanded the establishment of relations with the new government, citing active Soviet activity near the Turkish borders. Meanwhile, the problem of Turkey has caused numerous disagreements within the Community over what form of cooperation to choose for this country. Germany and the Netherlands were in favor of a customs union stemming from an association agreement, while France and Italy, fearing competition from Turkish fruit, preferred a more limited trade agreement. Negotiations were resumed on June 2, 1962. Finally, on September 12, 1963, on the basis of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome on the EEC, the Ankara Agreement establishing an association between Turkey and the European Communities was signed, which entered into force on December 1, 1964. The First financial protocol, according to which the European Investment Bank allocated ECU 175 million to the country at 3% per annum for economic development[5]. Turkey's request was granted due to a sharp increase in wheat purchases and increasing European demand for unskilled labor.

The Ankara agreement was a reflection of the strategic guidelines of both sides for mutual rapprochement. The purpose of the agreement was "to promote the constant and sustainable strengthening of trade and economic relations, taking into account the accelerated pace of development of the Turkish economy, increasing the level of employment and improving the living conditions of the Turkish people" (Article 2.1). Thus, the economic goal was to create ever-increasing relations between the people of Turkey and the peoples united in the EEC and to bridge the gap that existed between the Turkish economy and the economies of the Community member countries. The conclusion of an agreement with the EEC

provided the possibility of free movement of labor (Article 12). The political goal was defined as the joint defense of the principles underlying the Treaty establishing the EEC, determination to protect and strengthen peace and freedom. Türkiye also had to harmonize national legislation with the legal framework for the activities of the EEC. However, the Ankara Agreement did not allow Turkey's integration with the EEC to be considered in the medium term. The Ankara Agreement identified three stages: preparatory, transitional and final (Article 2.3). Yet the Ankara Agreement contained only a cautiously formulated prospect of accession: "As soon as the operation of this Agreement confirms Turkey's full acceptance of the obligations arising from the EEC Treaty, the contracting parties will consider the possibility of Turkey's admission to the Community" (Article 28). At the preparatory stage, Türkiye was supposed to strengthen its economy, bringing it closer to EEC standards. The stage was determined for a period of 5 years. During this period, a gradual reduction of tariff quotas and the provision of preferences were envisaged for a number of important Turkish agricultural exports, such as unprocessed tobacco, raisins, figs, hazelnuts (Article 3). Under the terms of the Agreement, Turkey's only obligation was to strive to extend the most favored nation treatment to all EEC countries (Article 8).

The transition phase was supposed to bring the economic and fiscal policies of Turkey and the Community closer together. It was envisaged that Turkey would gradually reduce duties and equivalent taxes and fees, the abolition of quantitative and equivalent restrictions and the adoption of the Common External Tariff of the Community. At the same time, liberalization measures in relation to the EEC were to be irreversible (Article 4). The final stage included "the creation of a customs union and coordination of economic policy." Turkey had to completely liberalize the import of industrial goods from the EEC, develop and adopt regulations for the migration of Turkish labor and capital (Article 5). Due to the fact that Turkey, not being a member of the Community, could not be represented in its bodies, the Ankara Agreement provided for the creation between Turkey and the EEC of bilateral association bodies corresponding to the status of the country at that time. Turkey's

association with the Common Market had its own institutions, which were endowed with operational autonomy. The main institution of the association, the Council, was to "guarantee the implementation and further development of the association" (Article 6). It was based on intergovernmental cooperation. The Association Council consisted, on the one hand, of representatives of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the governments of the EEC member states, and, on the other, of members of the Turkish government. Representatives of the Community and Turkey presided alternately (Article 24). The Council was the legislative basis for decision-making within the joint activities of the parties (Article 22). The Council made decisions unanimously, but it could only make useful recommendations (Article 23). He was also given the right to settle disputes arising within the association (Article 25). The mixed parliamentary committee consisted of 36 members of the European Parliament and the VNST (18 from each side), its task was democratic control over the development of the association. He could provide recommendations to the European Parliament and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Its functions were advisory (Article 27)[6].

In 1964 and 1967 Low-level tariffs were introduced on a total of 19 traditional Turkish exports, most notably raw tobacco, raisins, and dates[7]. Trade preferences were also granted to certain agricultural, fishing, and textile products. If before the signing of the Association Agreement the share of the EEC in Turkish exports was 30.8% with a downward trend, then during the preparatory phase it increased to 40.6% in 1972[8]. However, despite the benefits, provided to the main Turkish export products, Turkey's foreign trade with the Community maintained a negative balance. During the preparatory phase of the association, Turkey exported agricultural products and textiles to the EEC, and imported industrial products necessary for the implementation of the country's industrialization projects. At the same time, Turkish industry was protected from foreign competition thanks to high taxes on imported products. In addition, Türkiye applied a system of quantitative restrictions on imports. It is clear that the association regime functioned while Turkey coped with a

negative balance in foreign trade with the Community thanks to the foreign exchange transfers of workers, which the Common Market increasingly needed. However, the trade privileges and meager amount provided under the financial protocol fell far short of meeting Turkey's needs. In general, the result of the preparatory stage was positive in terms of the implementation of the provisions established by the Association Agreement. There was an increase in the volume of ties in all areas of trade and economic cooperation, creating a new quality of relations for Turkey with the EEC. The Turkish economy began to transform into an integral part of the European economy. Investments from European companies not only ensured the creation of new jobs, but also contributed to the adaptation of Turkish personnel to European quality standards.

3. The development of EU-Turkey relations in 1970-1990

On May 16, 1967, Turkey submitted an application to transfer its relations with the EEC to the next stage. There were various economic motivations underlying this request. Türkiye sought to seize new markets for its light industry products, ahead of Greece. But Turkey's primary goal was to increase the influx of foreign capital. This could be achieved in part through remittances from Turkish workers from Europe. Closer ties with the EEC could also help Turkey receive assistance from European investment funds. In addition, at the end of the 1960s. The economic situation in the EEC is favorable for Turkey. European economies were experiencing rapid growth, stimulated by low inflation and cheap raw materials on world markets, and accordingly they needed foreign labor. Compared to the preparatory phase, the transitional phase has faced serious political and economic difficulties since its entry into force. It began with the formation of a government coalition in Turkey, led by Ecevit, which was very hostile to the provisions of the Additional Protocol. This situation arose as a result of Ecevit's nationalistic beliefs and the unyielding anti-Western position of the National Salvation Party. The far-right parties (Islamists and the Türkiye Nationalist Movement Party) blocked the opportunities outlined by the Additional Protocol, viewing the EEC as a Christian club, a cultural antipode of Islam, wishing to dictate

its policies to Turkey. They opposed any rapprochement with Europe[9].

Moreover, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the crisis of military power in Greece led to large-scale changes in Turkey's relationship with the EEC. On July 3, 1974, Turkish troops invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern part of the island under the pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community from Greek Cypriot efforts to create a Union of Cyprus and Greece. In 1975, the chairman of the new Greek government, Constantine Karamanlis, applied for full accession of his country to the Community. Greece viewed joining the EEC as a means of containing the security threat posed by Turkey, which seemed especially acute after the intervention in Cyprus. Initially, the Community reacted extremely negatively to the Greek application. The European Commission report noted not only the weakness of the Greek economy, but also possible discrimination against Turkey[10]. However, the European Council rejected the recommendations of the European Commission and decided to begin negotiations on the full accession of Greece. The key argument in favor of this decision was the assumption that joining the Community would serve to strengthen the fragile democratic regime in Greece[11].

In the early 1970s. The situation in the global economy was characterized by growing instability, which manifested itself in the collapse of national currency rates and inflation. In addition, the oil crisis of 1973 also left its mark on the development of relations between the EEC and Turkey. The community has suspended imports of Turkish products and restricted the entry of foreign workers due to rising unemployment rates. Germany, France and the Benelux countries have decided to introduce a visa regime for Turkish citizens. As a result, foreign exchange remittances fell sharply, and Turkey faced rising external debt and trade deficits. Although Ankara has committed to trade liberalization, it has pursued an import substitution policy in an attempt to become self-sufficient in almost all areas. This contradicted the Community strategy, aimed at creating a free trade area, free movement of capital and labor between member

countries. The Turkish political elite, not agreeing with the economic conditions of the EEC, slowed down the pace of integration, considering competition unnecessary and premature for the country's industry. Representatives of the largest industrial enterprises began to call for amendments to the Additional Protocol in order to exclude from it the prospect of creating a customs union[12]. On the one hand, the Community fixed import quotas received by Turkey, on the other, Ankara froze its obligations under the Agreement and did not comply with the regime for reducing customs duties. In addition, the quota system has placed Turkey's imports in a dependent position in terms of countries and product mix. Nevertheless, on January 1, 1976, Ankara reduced customs duties and harmonized the list of goods exempt from them in accordance with the Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, the European Parliament, based on the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Association of the EEC and Turkey (Document 272/75), which met in Ankara from 15 to 20 September 1975, expressed disappointment at the complete lack of practical results of the negotiations between representatives of the two entities in Cyprus and stressed that the necessary lasting solution can only be worked out through negotiations. They were to be based on the thesis of a sovereign, independent state of Cyprus and the equality of both entities on the island (Article 4 of the Resolution). Concern was expressed about the growing balance of payments deficit in Turkey, despite positive developments in the development of trade with the Community (Article 7)[13]. Demirel's return to power in November 1979 was marked by a revival in relations between Turkey and the Community. One of the first steps of the new government was to call for the resumption of the association's activities. The Turkish authorities believed that they should apply for membership while the second wave of expansion was being prepared. They feared that the EEC would face too many problems with the integration of Greece, Spain and Portugal and would not consider new candidates for a long period[14]. On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government announced an economic stabilization program. Its short-term goal was to eliminate inflation and the

balance of payments deficit, and its long-term goal was to liberalize and restructure the Turkish economy to bring it to EEC standards[15]. In February 1980, the Association Council adopted a number of decisions regarding cooperation in socio-economic, technical economic, financial and agricultural fields, as well as the free movement of workers and guarantees of their social security[16]. Turkey has undertaken significant economic reforms based on the basic principles of the European Community. In order to overcome obstacles to Turkey's integration into the EEC, the government tried to raise the country's economic level through structural changes, the creation of new infrastructure, economic liberalization and trade reform. Türkiye abandoned the autarkic model of import substitution and opened its economy to the activities of market forces.

However, the intervention of the military in the political life of the country on September 11, 1980 had a negative impact on the attitude of the EEC towards Turkey. The military regime blocked the process of integration into the Community. After the military coup, the problem of democracy and human rights became the main issue in Turkey's relations with the EEC. On the day of the coup, the European Commission expressed the hope that human rights would be respected and democratic institutions would soon be restored[17]. On September 18, 1980, the European Parliament, while discussing the situation in Turkey, adopted a resolution expressing concern about political and civil rights and physical safety of prisoners. Ankara was reminded that respect for internationally recognized human rights was a fundamental condition for the Community's dialogue with the associated state. The EEC's wait was dictated by the lack of a definite opinion regarding the policy of the new regime in Ankara. The European Community was afraid to rashly condemn the regime and release it from its sphere of influence. Friendly and positive reports from the embassies of EEC member states in Turkey also prevented the Community from taking a hard line towards the military[18]. However, the European Parliament took an irreconcilable position towards the new regime in Ankara, mainly under the influence of European socialists and liberals. The main topic of the

parliamentary debates held on April 10, 1981 was the situation in Turkey. European socialists were of the opinion that it was necessary to suspend the Association Agreement between Turkey and the Community. As a result, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling on Ankara to restore democratic institutions within two months. By the end of 1981, a new crisis began in relations between Turkey and the Community, which lasted until the end of the military regime. It was caused by the fact that, from the point of view of the EEC, Turkey did not take the promised measures to quickly restore democracy. The European Commission strongly condemned the ban on political parties and the arrest of former Prime Minister Ecevit as actions contrary to the process of restoring democracy[19]. The European Parliament froze loans under the Fourth Financial Protocol.

The tough position of not only the European Parliament, but the Community as a whole meant the political isolation of Turkey in Europe, which affected its relations with individual EEC member states. Moreover, after joining the Community on January 1, 1981, Greece, using its veto power at meetings of the Council of Ministers, opposed the implementation of the Association Agreement with Turkey, citing human rights violations. She put forward her own conditions for the resumption of relations: Turkey's evacuation of its troops from Cyprus, abandonment of its aggressive policy towards neighboring countries and bringing it into line with the provisions of international law[20]. In addition, the political regime established by the Constitution adopted by the military in 1982, from which a number of liberal democratic principles operating in Europe were excluded, created a serious obstacle to Turkey's integration into the EEC. By 1983, stagnation in the interaction between Turkey and the Community was due not only to the internal political situation in this country, but also to its tense relations with Greece. On November 15, 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared independence, but was recognized only by Turkey. The European Community regretted the current situation, in particular the failed attempts by the United Nations to bring the parties to the negotiating table. In solidarity with the position of the UN, the Community

emphasized the integrity, independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and refused to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Although the Turkish authorities believed that the 1983 parliamentary elections signaled the restoration of democracy and that this should stimulate a warming of relations with the EEC, Western Europeans showed skepticism about the new regime in Turkey. On September 23, 1985, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the lack of respect for human rights in the country.¹⁴⁶ In response, Turkey promised to lift martial law, which prevented the normalization of relations, and allowed European representatives to monitor the human rights situation[21]. In January 1988, Özal's government signed the European Convention and the UN Convention for the Prevention of Torture; the first was immediately ratified in January, and the second in August of the same year. But freedom of thought and political association remained an important Western political value that was absent in Turkey, which was confirmed by the ban on communist and Islamist activities. European organizations called on Turkey to lift this ban, which was perceived as a serious obstacle to joining the EEC. On April 14, 1987, Turkey submitted an official request for full accession to the EEC, or rather three applications: to the European Coal and Steel Community, to Euratom and the European Economic Community on the basis of Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty and Article 237 of the EEC Treaty. This move was dictated by Özal's economic reforms and the modernization of Turkish industry[22]. Turkey's application came as a surprise to the institutions and governments of the Community member states. On April 27, 1987, the European Council took note of this request and turned to the European Commission so that it could make its decision. In addition, in May 1988, Greece interfered with a meeting of the Association Council. At the insistence of this country, the Council's recommendation included a thesis on the impact of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus on relations between Turkey and the EEC. The European Parliament resolution of May 20, 1988 on the situation on the island stated that the illegal occupation of part of the

territory of a country associated with the Community by the military forces of another association partner creates a significant obstacle to the normalization of relations with the latter, namely Turkey. Ankara decided to boycott the meeting of the Association Council as a sign of protest. This joint meeting would be very important for her: on the agenda was the issue of unfreezing the Fourth Financial Protocol, which Greece did not agree to. Finally, on 20 December 1989, the EEC Commission presented its "Opinion on Turkey's application for membership in the Community" in the form of a report approved by the European Council[23]. It emphasized that priority was given to achieving the objectives of the Single European Act and that it would be undesirable to begin accession negotiations with any country before 1993 due to the difficulties of the transition period. As an annex, the report "Turkish Economy: Structure and Development" was published, which was a detailed analysis of the state of the Turkish economy, including its comparison with Greece, Spain and Portugal as the least developed members of the EEC. The document indicated that the beginning of negotiations on the accession of any country to the Community should be based on two principles. The candidate country must be able to accept a number of restrictions obligatory for members of the Community and solve a number of problems that may arise in

Conclusions

Thus, Turkey's application was neither approved nor rejected by the governing bodies of the Community. This result reflected the contradictions, hesitations and fears within the EEC about Ankara's accession to it, which was reflected in the documents. But, having failed to achieve the main goal, Turkey's application nevertheless revived its relations with the EEC: efforts to develop them intensified on both sides, the political and technical mechanisms of the Association began to function again, and the implementation of measures aimed at the formation of the customs union was resumed on schedule. The EEC considered the latter as a necessary price and a tool for preserving Turkey's pro-European orientation, denying it entry. The decision of the European Community to postpone

connection with the gradual integration of the EEC countries. It was noted that these provisions are especially important for Turkey as a country with a significant territory and a rapidly growing population, but whose level of economic development, however, is generally below the general level of the Community. On February 5, 1990, the European Council generally approved the recommendations of the European Commission and instructed her to develop in detail proposals to strengthen relations with Ankara. The conclusion of the Council of Ministers of the EEC proposed the creation of new mechanisms for Turkey's adaptation to accession to the Community[24].

In addition, the Fourth Financial Protocol, signed in 1981, came into force. Based on this decision, on February 7, 1990, the EEC Commission prepared a list of necessary measures to cooperation with Turkey (Matthew Package), concerning the formation of a customs union in 1995 and the promotion of cooperation in the industrial, technological, political and cultural fields. But this package was not approved by the European Council due to opposition from Greece. Thus, Turkey's application was neither satisfied nor rejected by the governing bodies of the Community. This result reflected the contradictions, hesitations and concerns within the EEC regarding Ankara's accession to it, which was reflected in the documents.

Turkey's admission for an indefinite period was met with deep disappointment and indignation. It should be noted that the collapse of the USSR eliminated the Soviet threat to the West and, consequently, questioned Turkey's usefulness for the EEC. Strategic security considerations have been partially replaced by political, economic and cultural ones. The problems of democracy and human rights have become increasingly prevalent in Ankara's relations with the EEC. But the Turkish authorities failed to respond in time to the shift in the Community's priorities. They believed that the economic reforms implemented since 1980 would be a sufficient circumstance in favor of joining.

Summarizing the materials of the scientific article, it can be stated that the political will to meet each other halfway was

present on both sides. Along with this, Turkey and the EEC had in mind certain political and economic risks. The community was afraid of the influence of law enforcement agencies and the Muslim factor in Ankara's politics. As for Turkey, its

economic structure, persistent macroeconomic instability and social uncertainty gave rise to the desire to "get" a stable market for the EEC, but at the same time "alienated" it from the Community.

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ҚЫРҒИ-ҚАБАҚ СОҒЫС КЕЗІНДЕГІ ТҮРКИЯ МЕН ЕУРОПАЛЫҚ ОДАҚ АРАСЫНДАҒЫ ҮНТІМАҚТАСТЫҚ (1947-1991 жж.)

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СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО ТУРЦИИ И ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА В ПЕРИОД ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ (1947-1991гг.)

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